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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE: AMERICAN AND KOREAN RULES
UNDER DIFFERENT ENDOGENOUS CONDITIONS
AND FORMS OF CAPITALISM
Robert J. Rhee*

Advanced economies operate under different forms of
capitalism and social order. Corporate law is fixed only
insofar as a country's political economy and social
This article explains why an
organization are static.
advanced economy may choose inefficient rules. Korean rules
are the product of past industrial development policies and
current social-political-economic conditions; endogenous
conditions align corporate law with nationalisticsentiments
and the public interest. The cost of this policy is diminution
of firm value. The benefit is the erection of a plausible
distinction between rule- and fact-based control of key
corporate groups. This system maintains de facto national
control of major firms despite the legal structure of liberal
foreign investment rules that are expected of an advanced
economy and democracy. Contrary to the assumption of past
critiques, enacting a more efficient corporate law is not the
* John H. and Mary Lou Dasburg Professor of Law, University of Florida
Levin School of Law; Fulbright Distinguished Lecturer, Yonsei University Law
School, 2017-2018. This article was made possible by my Fulbright grant. I
thank the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the Council for
International Exchange of Scholars of the Institute of International Education,
the Korean-American Educational Commission, Yonsei University Law School,
and Dean Laura Rosenbury for their support of my teaching and scholarship
during my grant term. On a personal note, I am thankful for the opportunity to

connect my cultural heritage as a Korean immigrant with my academic interest
in corporate law through this knowledge exchange. I have learned much through
this project. An earlier fragment of this paper was presented at a faculty
colloquium sponsored by the Yonsei Institute for Legal Studies, and at the 15th
Asian Law Institute Conference, Seoul National University School of Law, Seoul,
Korea. This article was presented at the 2020 Annual Conference of American
Association of Law Schools, Section on East Asian Law and Society, Washington,
DC, and the 16th Asian Law Institute Conference, National University of
I thank all conference
Singapore Faculty of Law, Singapore, Singapore.
participants, and also Jonathan Kang, Hongki Kim, Joongi Kim, Kun-Chol Kim,
Chulwoo Lee, Meehyun Lee, Peter Molk, William Page, Dan Puchniak, Bernard
Sharfman, and Daniel Sokol for their many helpful comments.
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problem. From the perspective of Korean policymakers, the
problem is the weighing of priority public interests and
attendant costs given endogenous conditions, as neither the
calculus of cost-benefit nor the conditions are fixed in time.
Unique corporate rules and governance are products of
each country's political economy. Their determinantsare the
meta-dynamics of the endogenous forms of capitalism and
social order. This idea is generalizable to American corporate
law and governance. There is no exceptional reason why
American law would be immune from shifting forces of social,
political, and cultural change. If the form of American
capitalism or social order has not reached an "end of history"
and, in fact, endogenous conditions change in some
fundamental way, the axiomatic conceptions that have
governed the past forty years of the neoliberal consensus may
give way to new models of corporatelaw and governance. At
a time of much uncertainty and upheaval in American
political, economic, and social conditions, we see a glimmer
of this possibility in similarpronouncements on fundamental
conceptions of American corporate law and governance that
have been in place since the Reagan era by two ideological
antipodes today, Senator Elizabeth Warren and the Business
Roundtable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the corporate law of the Republic of Korea ("Korea")
1
borrows much from American law, the two differ. The linchpin of
American law is the principle that managers who control the
2
These duties are key legal
corporation owe fiduciary duties.
3
doctrines that mitigate agency cost. They ensure that managers act
in good faith and run the business for the benefit of the corporation
and all shareholders. This end is served by devices such as derivative
4
As written, Korean law mimics
suits and independent directors.
5
certain aspects of American law on duties. As applied, it diverges
because, as a matter of law and fact, Korean rules and its legal system
structurally inhibit private enforcement and accountability of
6
directors and controlling shareholders.
Scholars, policymakers, and capital markets have known about
the fundamental problem: that is control by heirs and families of
founding entrepreneurs.7 The largest Korean companies are public
corporations, mostly owned by foreign and domestic shareholders,
and operate on a global scale; yet, they are still managed like their
progenitors, small closely-held family businesses, even though
8
families now own relatively little equity. This situation presents a
unique Korean twist on the classic problem of the separation of
ownership and control. 9 Absent effective monitoring, abuses by
0
The
managers and controlling shareholders go unchecked.1
application of American rules on fiduciary duties and their
enforcement, if feasible and adopted, would improve Korean corporate

1. HAKSOo Ko, AN EcoNOMIC APPROACH TO KOREAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE
AND CORPORATE LAw 9 (2007).

2. Jill E. Fisch, The PeculiarRole of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for CorporateCharters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2000) ("[T]he interpretation
and application of these fiduciary principles is the heart of corporate law . ... ).
3. See Dechert v. Cadle Co., 333 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.);
D. Theodore Rave, Politiciansas Fiduciaries,126 HARv. L. REV. 671, 706 (2013)
4. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?,
100 MINN. L. REv. 561, 588-89 n.142 (2015); Martin Petrin, Corporate
Management in the Age of AI, 2019 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 965, 1000-01 (2019).
5. See Hwa-Jin Kim & Sung-Joon Park, Directors'Dutiesand Liabilities in
Korean Companies, in KOREAN BUSINESS LAW 4 n.11 (Hwa-Jin Kim ed., 2012).
6. See infra Subparts II.A. and IV.B.
7. See infra Subparts IV.B.
8. See infra notes 27, 82.
9. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5-6 (1932).

C.

MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION

10. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (suggesting that
fiduciary duties arise as a result of "public policy, existing through the years, and
derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives").
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governance.11 Yet the problem of control has persisted throughout
the era of modern Korean industry and corporations. 12
It is axiomatic that the policy end of American corporate law is
efficiency.13 The American market enjoys higher valuations than the
Korean market, and some portion of this premium is attributable to
rules that better mitigate managerial agency cost. 14 Compliance with
duties and accountability of controlling shareholders would increase
firm value. 15 Firms suffer from the infamous "Korean discount" in
which capital markets systematically discount their values. 16
Criticism of Korean law and governance is legion. 17 Policymakers are
surely aware of the fundamental problems, 18 and proposed solutions
are not lost on them. 19 Yet Korean law has not instituted effective
solutions. An accountability system to thwart controlling shareholder
abuse has been elusive. The gaps in law and instances of abuse are
so apparent that they must be the product of deliberate, albeit
resigned, choice. This article does not critique Korean corporate law
based on a normative argument for efficiency. That exercise would
be meaningless because nations may choose to opt out of efficient
policies given their unique priorities. This article answers a less
explored, more interesting question: why choose inefficient rules?

11. See infra Subpart VI.A. (noting that the wholesale transplantation of
American rules and system to Korea would be infeasible).
12. Bernard Black et al., CorporateGovernance in Korea at the Millennium:
EnhancingInternationalCompetitiveness, 26 J. CoRP. L. 537, 558-59 (2001).
13. NAF Holdings, LLC v. Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd., 118 A.3d 175, 181 (Del.
2015).
14.

See ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION

& DEVELOPMENT,

Chapter 4: The Theory of the Market for Corporate Control and the Current State
of the Market for Corporate Control in China, https://www.oecd.org/
corporate/calcorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/31601011.pdf
(last
visited July 28, 2020).
15. See id.
16. See infra Subpart IV.A.
17. E.g., Joongi Kim, A Forensic Study of Daewoo's Corporate Governance:
Does Responsibility for the Meltdown Solely Lie with the Chaebol and Korea?, 28
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 273, 296-315 (2008). See generally Black et al., supranote
12 (discussing issues with corporate governance and recommending various
reforms through amendments to the Korean Commercial Code); Hwa-Jin Kim,
Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation
of FinancialInstitutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 61 (1999) (discussing
problems with the traditional "Korean institution," including problems with
chaebols and corporate governance in Korea).
18. See Black et al., supra note 12, at 541 (presenting legal reform
recommendations to the Korean Ministry of Justice as a part of a World Bank
funded project).
19. See Bryan Harris, PresidentMoon's Tricky Mission to Tame Korea Inc.,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/fale3e00-947b-11e7bdfa-eda243196c2c; Kenichi Yamada, Samsung Torn Over Moon's Push to Break
up
Chaebol, NIKKEI ASIAN
REV.
(Dec.
04,
2018,
6:32
JST),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Samsung-torn-over-Moon-s-pushto-break-up-chaebol.
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In the case of Korea, there are two potential answers. The most
obvious is that business elites have captured policymakers and the
rule of law. 20 This answer is substantially true and supported by
much evidence-a long, infamous history of public corruption
21
between business elites and the highest level of government.
Clearly, this rationale is illegitimate and cannot rationally justify the
system. Corruption, albeit real, is a convenient culprit, but ultimately
an incomplete answer. 22 Korea is a robust democracy where popular
23
will is strong in the political process, and the economy is highly
Corruption stands alongside rational, legitimate
advanced.
24
Control by
prioritization to prop up inefficient law and governance.
national
on
based
ultimately
choice
governing families is a public
25
a mixed
produces
choice
this
interest. Like many difficult decisions,
26
This
calculus.
social
a
ultimately
bag of costs and benefits that is
of
choice
the
for
reasons
article examines these rational, legitimate
inefficiency.
Corporate law and governance reflect each nation's political
Large determinants are the
economy and legal system. 27
(e.g., liberal versus social
order
macrostructures of political

20.

See

Joongi Kim, The Formation of the Rule of Law in Corporate

Governance, in THE RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH KOREA 119-23 (Jungryn Mo & David

W. Brady eds., 2009) (describing Korean corporate governance as "largely
revolved around rule of man in lieu of rule of law" and that authoritarian
tendencies sometimes led to corruption and distorted incentives).
21. See infra note 104; see infra note 119 (describing the convictions of prior
Korean presidents for corruption). In terms of transparency, the following is one
ranking of Asia-Pacific countries and the United States: New Zealand (2),
Singapore (3), Australia (13), Hong Kong (14), Japan (18), United States (22),
Taiwan (31), Korea (45), Malaysia (61), India (78), China (87), Indonesia (89).
TRANSPARENCY INT'L CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, 2018 2-3 (2019).
22. Simon Denyer & Min Joo Kim, Another Former South Korea President
AM),
2018,
3:11
(Oct.
5,
Corruption, WASH. POsT
Jailed for
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asiapacific/another-former-south7 2
korea-president-jailed-for-corruption/2018/10/05/ e 16cc6-c866- 11e8-915809630a6d8725_story.html.
23. See infra note 323.
24. Denyer & Kim, supra note 22.
25. RACHEL PREMACK,
CONGLOMERATES 2-3 (2017).

SAGE

BUSINESS

RESEARCH,

SOUTH

KOREA'S

26. See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 286-87 (2008).
27. See Kim, supra note 20, at 119-20 (describing corporate governance as
based on a political economy centered on the "authoritarian state [which] served
as the primary guardian overseeing controlling-shareholders' and the public's
interests"). See generally MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003) (discussing

corporate law and governance among common and civil law nations and different
democratic systems); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998) (examining rules protecting shareholders among common law and
civil law nations).
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democracy) and legal system (e.g., common versus civil law). 28 A
comparative analysis must also consider unique features of internal
conditions, including history, culture, social order, economy, and
industrial policy. 2 9 An analysis of these granular details reveals that
Korean law and governance are the product of two priority interests
resulting in a duopoly of control: firstly, controlling shareholders
desire dynastic corporate governance; secondly, the government seeks
a say in corporate governance in furtherance of economic planning in
a state-corporate form of capitalism. 30 These interests converge to
preserve control of corporate groups in the hands of controlling
families at the first instance, subject to the government's influence as
a monitor and a key shareholder.31 This article does not critique the
Korean system on the ground that wealth maximization is a selfevident end.32 Each country chooses its values, which in a democracy
are products of compromise inherent in a social compact. Inefficient
outcomes may serve other legitimate policy ends, such as employee
welfare and equitable wealth distribution in social democracies. 33
The critique of Korean law and governance here is based on
present and future downstream effects of inefficiency on the broader
society since time and social conditions are not fixed. In the twentyfirst century, Korea's corporate law and economy confront defining
challenges. Filial corporate governance means that control of the
corporate system passes along patrilineal lines. 34 This system
imposes tremendous costs and elicits populist opposition. 35 The costs
test the efficacy of the government's role in intermediating these
social tensions and managing the economy.3 6 They raise important
questions. Is Korea best served when a few plutocratic families
control a large portion of its economy? With an open market and
increasing investor pressure, how much longer can control be
maintained? Is the third or fourth generation of families capable of

28. See ROE, supra note 27, at 3-5 (noting that politics and political
organization of nations, such as social democracies, are significant determinants
of corporate law and governance).
29. See generally Joongi Kim, supra note 17 (taking into account history,
culture, social order, economy, and industrial policy in a comparative analysis).
30. See Hwa-Jin Kim, supranote 17, at 68.
31. See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 284.
32. Compare Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 192
(1980), with Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and
Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 243 (1980).
33. Mark J. Roe, Introduction: Political vs. Corporate Institutions as
Explaining Western Securities Markets?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANcE: POLITICAL

AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 2, 4-5 (Mark J. Roe ed., 2005).
34. See generally Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 284 (discussing the
patriarchic management style of chaebols).
35. Cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 28-29 (1994) (discussing the role of

populism in the structure of corporate ownership and capital markets).
36. Id.
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directing Korea Inc.? The past is lore, the present fades, the future
becomes. The answers to these questions cannot be viewed just
through the lens of an American rule- and property-centric prism.
The first is non-Korean
This article has two audiences.
actors, such as American
market
policymakers, scholars, and foreign
The value here is an
funds.
activist shareholders and hedge
the rational choice of
system,
explanation of the uniqueness of the
This article broadens
reform.
facing
inefficiency, and the challenges
and economics. 37 It
of
law
prism
the analysis beyond the American
analyzes the unique bundle of endogenous conditions. Determinants
are the nation's politics, history, culture, institutions, and social
order. This article explains how corporate governance is connected to
societal characteristics, such as Korea's strong embrace of Confucian
social philosophy and sense of collective stake in the national
economy.
The second audience is Korean policymakers and scholars. The
value here is a critique from outside the box of an internally coherent,
accepted conception of their corporate law and governance. This
audience must be painfully aware of the obvious costs of maintaining
an inefficient system. This article identifies another social problem,
one that may be less apparent, but no less significant: that is the link
between poor corporate governance and the current problem of social
38
This article proposes reforms that
and economic inequity in Korea.
consider the country's unique
and
efficiency
enhance
would
with Korean characteristics.
reforms
i.e.,
conditions,
endogenous
parts. Part II provides a
eight
into
organized
is
article
This
primer on aspects of Korean capitalism. A concentration of a few
corporate groups account for the bulk of the country's Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP").3 9 The largest firms are public but are controlled by
40
a few families who own little equity. This situation begets the most
significant problem of law and governance.
Part III conducts a comparative analysis of fundamental rules.
Korean law mimics American rules on fiduciary duties in some
respects, but in important ways they diverge. Korean law fails to

37.

See generally FRANK H. EASTERBOOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIc

39.

PREMACK, supra note 25, at 4.

STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (arguing American corporate law serves as
an low-cost enforcement mechanism that emulates the agreements corporate
investors and managers would reach if they could bargain over every
contingency).
38. See infra Part IV.
40. See Eugene Kim & Kim Ah-jeong, Reforming Chaebol Boards Is a Big
Job. Here's How It Can Happen, KOREA HERALD (Feb. 13, 2018, 5:43 PM),
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180213000346.
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enforce duties. 4 1 This failure facilitates control by families of the
founders.4 2 This outcome is the core flaw in Korean law.
Part IV analyzes the social costs of the policy choice of inefficient
rules. The primary cost is lower firm valuations.4 3 A secondary effect
is wealth inequity and lack of social mobility in a society where the
initial distribution of wealth occurred rapidly and fortuitously.44 An
underperforming corporate market ossifies economic classes in
Korean society. 45
Part V explains the rational choice of lax laws and attendant
social costs. 46 The policy aligns the common interests of the state and
families. Given control of vital economic assets as a priority interest,
the most consequential policy issue today is whether the costs of
dynastic succession to the third and fourth generation will continue
to be acceptable.
Part VI proposes reforms. Legal transplantation of an Americanstyle private litigation model and robust conception of independent
directors is infeasible because of insurmountable institutional and
cultural differences. American endogenous conditions cannot be
assumed. Enforcement is the key, but reform toward efficiency must
have Korean characteristics.
Part VII argues that the meta-dynamics of political economy are
generalizable to the American situation. Law and governance are not
fixed, not even in the United States where efficiency and wealth
maximization have been axiomatic since the neoliberal turn. Rather,
they are subject to internal conditions. This idea is illustrated by
similar proposals for fundamental changes to corporate law made by
two ideological bookends, Senator Elizabeth Warren and the Business
Roundtable.
Part VIII concludes that corporate law serves endogenous
political economy and social order. Given a set of conditions, an
advanced economy may choose inefficient rules in favor of priority
interests. In the course of history, in any given country, the bundle
of conditions may change, and such change may bring about a
reordering of priorities.

II. A PRIMER ON KOREAN CAPITALISM AND CHAEBOLS
A comparative legal analysis requires an accounting of the
historical, social, political, and economic conditions.4 7
Korea's
41. Kim, supra note 20, at 130.
42. See id. at 131.
43. The Korea Discount: Corporate Governance Explains South Korea's Low
Stockmarket Ratings, ECoNOMIST (Feb. 11, 2012), https://www.economist.com/
finance-and-economics/2012/02/1 1/minority-report.
44. See infra Subpart IV.B.
45. See infra Subpart IV.B.
46. See infra Part V.
47. Bliss Burdett Pak, CorporateGovernance, in KOREAN BUSINESS LAW: THE
LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND BEYOND 94 (Jasper Kim ed., 2010).
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political economy is democratic capitalism, a written constitution48
Little
based political system, and an advanced market economy.
international
in
Korea
of
needs to be said about the importance
economy and geopolitics. It is a longtime political and military ally of
49
the United States and a major trading partner. Positioned between
China and Japan, the second and third largest economies in the world
and historical adversaries, and bordering North Korea, a totalitarian
50
rogue nuclear state, Korea occupies a strategic geopolitical position.
Belied by its small geographic size and lack of natural resources, it is
a major advanced economy in East Asia and a global economic
power. 5 1 It is a member of the G-20 and the Organization for
52
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). It ranks twelfth
53
The
globally in terms of GDP, on par with Canada and Russia.
48. DAEHANMINGUK HUNBEOB arts. 1(1), 119(2) (S. Kor.) [hereinafter
at
available
translation
(English
CONSTITUTION"]
"KOREAN
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/engservicelawView.do?hseq=1&lang=ENG).
"Daehanminguk hunbeob" means "Korean constitution." The Korean Legislation
Research Institute provides English translations of all Korean statutes and
regulations.

49. American and Korean political and military alliances date back to the
Korean War (1950-1953) and the start of the Cold War (1945-1991). Under
American economic sponsorship, Korean industrial modernization benefitted
from mercantilist policies of subsidization of industry, protection of domestic
markets, and the development of an export economy, which ultimately resulted
in the attainment of an advanced economy. BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN
THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 310-11, 314-18 (updated ed. 2005). See Jaymin

Lee, A Half Century of Korean Economic Development: 1952-2002, in KOREAN
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 523 (Andrew Eungi Kim ed., 2017) (noting that Korea
enjoyed an "asymmetrical relationship" with the United States under neomercantilist policies); Chung-in Moon & Byung-joon Jun, Modernization
Strategy: Ideas and Influence, in THE PARK CHUNG HEE ERA: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH KOREA 127 (Byung-kook Kim & Ezra F. Vogel eds.,

2013) (noting a strategy of "economic nationalism and mercantilism" that "was in
essence illiberal in nature . .. implemented from the top down by the state").
50. See generally TIM MARSHALL, PRISONERS OF GEOGRAPHY: TEN MAPS THAT
EXPLAIN EVERYTHING ABOUT THE WORLD 208-29 (2016) (discussing the strategic

position of Korea).
51. In some ways, Korean economic development is an enigma, but human
capital was an important factor in the country's rapid rise. See CUMINGS, supra
note 49, at 300-01 ("There you have it: no capitalists, no Protestants, no
merchants, no money, no market, no resources, no get-up-and-go, let alone no
discernible history of commerce, foreign trade, or industrial development, so on
and so forth-and yet there it is.. . . [Due to compulsory education] the broad
Korean work force was better suited to industrial tasks than was the population
of many other countries. The long tradition of bureaucratic governance by
scholar-officials, reaching preindustrial peaks as high as anywhere else, was
excellent background for a state-led development program.").
52. InternationalRelations, KOREA.NET, http://korea.net (last visited July 28,
2020) (click the dropdown menu, follow the "Government" link, follow the link for
"Constitution and Government," and then select "International Relations.").
53. The following are country rankings by GDP (in $ trillion): United States
$20.4, China $14.1, Japan $5.2, Germany $4.2, U.K. $2.9, France $2.9, India $2.8,
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capitalization of the Korean equity market ranks fourteenth in the
world, constituting about 2 percent of global capitalization.54 Major
companies include Samsung, Hyundai, Kia, LG, SK, Lotte, Hanjin,
and Korean Air. Its corporate law and governance are important
because its markets are open to foreign investors under liberal
investment rules. 55
Two aspects of the Korean corporate market are significant.
First, the economy is concentrated in a handful of corporate groups
controlled by a small group of families.5 6 The fate of the entire
economy-quite literally-rests in the managerial hands of a few
plutocrats. 57 Second, Korea leans toward a strong model of statecorporate capitalism in which the state plays a large role in managing
the economy and monitoring the internal and external affairs of
corporations. 58 The state's role in the economy is formally recognized

Italy $2.2, Brazil $2.1, Canada $1.8, Russia $1.7, Korea $1.7. World Economic
Outlook
Database,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2020/01/weodata/index.asp

(last

updated July 2018).
54. Kyung-Hoon Chun, Korea's Mandatory Independent Directors:Expected
and Unexpected Roles, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL,
CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 176, 179 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds.,
2017).
55. See Foreign Investment Promotion Act, Act No. 5557, Sept. 16, 1998,
amended by Act No. 13854, Jan. 27, 2016, art. 3-4 (S. Kor.) (providing legal
protections to foreign investors and permitting foreign investment,) translatedin
Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/
engservice/lawView.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG. Foreigners own 34 percent of
the market capitalization of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index ("KOSPI")
and 11 percent of the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
("KOSDAQ") as of July 2017. Yoon Jung Sil, Foreign Stock Ownership Surpasses
620 Trillion Won,
KOREABUSINESS
(July 24,
2017,
01:45
AM),
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=18740.
56. PREMACK, supra note 25, at 3; A.C. Pritchard, Monitoring of Corporate
Groups by Independent Directors, in KOREAN BUSINESS LAw, supra note 5, at 77,
80.
57. See CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 330 (noting that by the mid-1990s ten
families controlled 60 percent of the economy); Kwon Eun-jung, Top Ten Chaebol
Now Almost 80% of Korean Economy, HANKYOREH (Aug. 28, 2012, 12:15 KST),
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/ englishedition/e_business/549028.html; Koichi
Kato, Top Four Chaebol Generate 90% of South Korean Conglomerate Profits,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (April 10, 2014, 0:00 JST), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/
Top-four-chaebol-generate-90-of-South-Korean-conglomerate-profits;
Sotaro
Suzuki, South Korea's Corporate Giants Face Reckoning Over Outsize Influence:
Top Five Business Groups Control 60% of Country's Economy, NIKKEI ASIAN REV.
(Dec. 6, 2017, 11:30 JST), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/South-Korea-scorporate-giants-face-reckoning-over-outsize-influence.
58. See Jongcheol Kim, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION To KOREAN
LAw 31, 79 (Korea Legislation Research Institute ed., 2013) (characterizing the
Korean economy "as a kind of mixed-economy or a 'social market economy"'); see
also MICHAEL BREEN, THE STORY OF A NATION: THE NEW KOREANS 218 (2017)

("Korea appeared capitalist on the surface, but socialist in practice and attitude
in terms of the strength of central control."); CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 331
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in the Korean Constitution. 59 These public and private facets of
60
corporate law and governance are rooted in history.
Korea was not always wealthy. The twentieth century was a
period of profound tragedies and ultimate triumph. Korea was
colonized by imperial Japan from 1910 to 1945.61 In the twilight of
World War II, Korea was divided between the North and the South
62
a fateful legacy that still
by the United States and Russia,
(1950-1953), South Korea
War
Korean
the
reverberates today. After
was destitute and war-torn: no capital, commerce, infrastructure,
institutions, or natural resources.6 3 The story of its economic miracle,
from the tragedies of the first half of the twentieth century to the
64
riches and triumph of the second half, is well-known. A short recital
provides the necessary orientation.
Under American sponsorship in the midst of Cold War
geopolitics, 65 economic modernization and business enterprise began
66
in the 1960s under the regime of Chung Hee Park, a dictator who
took power in a military coup in 1961 and ruled until his
assassination in 1979.67 His government strategically directed public

(characterizing the roots of Korean industrialization as an "Asian developmental
state" and a "state-led neomercantilist program").
59. See KOREAN CONSTITUTION, art. 119(2) (S. Kor.) ("The State may regulate
and coordinate economic affairs in order to maintain the balanced growth and
stability of the national economy, to ensure proper distribution of income, to
prevent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic power and to
democratize the economy through harmony among the economic agents."); id.
arts. 123(2)-(3) ("The State shall have the duty to foster regional economies to
ensure the balanced development of all regions. The State shall protect and foster
small and medium enterprises."); see also infra note 240.
60. See CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 317 ("[E]ach favored chaeb6l, 'for all
practical purposes, was a private agency of public purpose."').
61. Id. at 145, 148. This history still reverberates today. Korea and Japan
are currently engaged in a trade war that originates from historical grievances.
See Youkyung Lee & Sohee Kim, Why Japan and South Korea Have Their Own
PM),
7:24
25,
2019,
(Nov.
POST
WASH.
War,
Trade
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-japan-and-south-korea-havetheir-own-trade-war/2019/11/25/106fe348-Of54- 1 lea-924cb34dO9bbc948_story.html.
62.

CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 187.

63. See Liam Stack, Korean War, a 'Forgotten'Conflict That Shaped the
Modern World, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/
world/asia/korean-war-history.html.
64. See Richard W. Rahn, Korea's Economic Miracle, WASH. TIMES (May 8,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/8/south-korea-has2017),
undergone-an-economic-miracle/.
65. See supra note 49.
66. In Korean, the surname is presented first and the given name second,
the opposite of the Anglo-American convention. The American convention is used
here so that non-Korean readers do not confuse the names.
67. See Yong-Sup Han, The May Sixteenth Military Coup, in THE PARK
CHUNG HEE ERA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH KOREA 35, 482 (Byung-Kook
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resources, much of which were American development aid, toward
specific industrial sectors, firms, and entrepreneurs. 68
The
government picked winners and losers in private enterprise with the
idea that the winners would drive economic growth and national
revival. 69 The winners were certain families. The policy was a strong
form of state-based capitalism, which is rooted in the constitutional
scheme of government. 70 Government-sponsored industrialization
modernized the economy, but also brought about attendant policy
problems.71
Over time, these family-led businesses, called chaebols,
consolidated their grip on the economy through continued statesupported expansion. 72 Unlike North Korea and China, South Korea
was never a communist state that broadly owned or controlled the
means of production. 73 Firms were privately owned, but the state
played a major role in their internal and external affairs, including
such matters as asset allocation and strategic direction. 74 The state
financed and directed industrial development and national economic
strategy but then let the "animal spirits" of entrepreneurs own and
control the businesses. 75 While the United States has had a long
history of industrial enterprises dating back to the nineteenth
century, 76 the Korean experience
of large-scale industrial
corporations has only been a few decades, dating back to the Chung
Hee Park era (1961-1979).77
As industrialization rapidly continued, the private wealth of
founding families and the feasibility of debt financing to capitalize

Kim & Ezra F. Vogel eds., 2011). Prior to this period, Korea was an agrarian
society. CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 182.
68. Eun Mee Kim & Gil-Sung Park, The Chaebol, in THE PARK CHUNG HEE
ERA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH KOREA, supra note 49, at 266-68.
69. See id. at 268 ("Park backed his chaebol allies with massive subsidized
resources, but contrary to the portrayal of guaranteed business success, he was
prepared to let failing chaebols groups go under, once he thought he had
exhausted relief measures."); see also CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 316-18;
FRANcIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES & THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY

138-39 (1995) (describing the ways in which the government supported chaebol
ventures); Kim, supra note 58, at 92.
70. See supra notes 47, 58, and accompanying text.
71. See Kim & Park, supra note 68, at 267.
72. Id. at 266, 268.
73.

See KOREAN CONSTITUTION, art. 126 (S. Kor.) ("Private enterprises shall

not be nationalized nor transferred to ownership by a local government, nor shall
their management be controlled or administered by the State, except in cases as
prescribed by Act to meet urgent necessities of national defense or the national
economy.").
74. See Kim & Park, supra note 68, at 265-66, 276.
75. See id. at 267.
76. See generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. AUSTIN KERR, BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 125-65 (3d ed. 1994) (providing examples of

American industrial enterprises).
77. See Kim & Park, supra note 68, at 266.
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78
Advanced
corporate ventures of global scale reached their limits.
including
markets
open
by
market-based economies are characterized
79
foreign
and
domestic
to
turned
As Korean firms
public equities.
80
Chaebol
diluted.
were
founders
of
investors, the ownership stakes
families today own about 1 percent of the economic rights of all group
companies; 81 nevertheless, they still control the most important
Since
corporate groups and thus the national economy.82
chaebols
century,
mid-twentieth
the
in
began
industrialization
evolved from family-owned businesses into investor-owned public
companies.83 Yet in the twenty-first century, they are still managed
like closely-held firms and controlled by families through
84
intergenerational transfer of control.
The chaebols represent a unique twist on the Berle-Means
85
In the United
problem of the separation of ownership and control.
managers
with
rests
generally
States, control of public companies
86
incentivize
collectively
devices
Various
who own little equity.
performance and discipline abuse, such as executive compensation,
shareholder activism, market for corporate control, derivative suits,
and independent boards. 87 The separation of ownership and control
88
in Korea takes the form of control by families who own little equity.
The agency problem in Korea is much more acute. Families cannot
be fired by the board or the market. 89 They are only sporadically
disciplined by the government, often for political reasons and

.

78. Id. at 286.
79. See infra Subpart V.A.
80. See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 285 ("In the 1970s, however, the
government browbeat chaebols into listing their major companies on the stock
Listing by chaebols served two governmental purposes. First,
exchange.
compelling chaebol families to disperse their ownership to the public would lead
to sharing of the benefits that chaebols received from the special preferences.
Second, rights offering served to provide much-needed liquidity to the fledgling
stock market. Families initially resisted listing their companies out of concerns
that dispersion of their ownership could threaten their control.").
81. See Eun-jung, supranote 57 ("[S]hares owned by the heads of the top ten
groups themselves dipped from 1.4% in 2002 to 1.1% in 2011."); Kim & Ah-jeong,
supra note 40 ("In Korea, chaebol families often actually own only small fractions
of the companies they control."); Lee Sun-young, Chaebol 'Owners' Control
July 8, 2016),
Groups with 0.9% Shares, KOREA HERALD (last updated
2
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=2016070700081
82. See supra note 56.
83. See supra notes 80-81.
84. See supra note 34.
85.

BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 9, at 5-6.

86. David I. Walker, The Manager's Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 610
(2005).
87. SEA-JIN CHANG, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF KOREAN
BUSINESS GROUPS 172 (2003).

88. See Sun-young, supra note 81.
89. See CHANG, supranote 87, at 163, 184; Chun, supra note 54, at 179-80.
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appeasement in the face of popular disapproval of bad behavior. 90
Control passes in a hereditary line of succession. 91 This problem is
unique in the global market of advanced economies. In much of the
world, including the United States, corporations have controlling
shareholders; 92 however, control ultimately lies in property rights,
ownership of stock with voting rights therein. Korea has an inverted
controlling shareholder problem. 93 It is the only country among
advanced
nations
where
minority
shareholders,
without
commensurate property rights, exercise control to abuse the
majority. 94
How do chaebol families maintain control of large corporate
groups of international scale with so little equity? The answer to this
enigma does not lie solely in legal property rights. Cultural factors
and government support play important roles in de facto control. 95
Chaebols are corporate groups, but some are not organized in a
holding company structure.
Chaebol families lack the personal
wealth to own a controlling stake in a hierarchical corporate group. 96
They achieve control through cross-shareholdings in loosely affiliated
companies. 97

The chart below provides a simple stylized example of a
crossholding scheme. Imagine a simple corporate group of firms A, B,
C, and D and two groups of shareholders: family and nonfamily. Firm
D is a key asset in the group and has a value of 1,000. The corporate
group is arranged not as a holding company structure, but as a crossshareholding structure. Firm D owns 10 percent stakes in firms A,
B, and C (see dotted lines), and it has a public float of 80 percent (see
dashed line) and direct family ownership of 2 percent.

90. See Carlos Tejada, Money, Power, Family: Inside South Korea's Chaebol,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/southkorea-chaebol-samsung.html.
91.

See CHUNHYO KIM, SAMSUNG, MEDIA EMPIRE AND FAMILY 2 (2016).

92. ROE, supra note 27, at 2.
93. See Chun, supra note 54, at 176, 180.
94. Id. at 180.
95. Id. at 179-80; see Hwa-Jin Kim, supranote 17, at 68.
96. See Chun, supra note 54, at 180.
97. Id. (noting that "cross-shareholdings, circular shareholdings and
pyramidal structures" enable the exercise of control that is "substantially greater
than their economic cash flow rights"); Pak, supra note 4747, at 96 (describing
the "chaebolcircular-web ownership structure").
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FIGURE 1. CROSSHOLDING SCHEME EXAMPLE
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The family controls the firm through a circular crossshareholding arrangement (see solid lines). The family de jure
controls firm A with a 50 percent holding, but firm A has a value of
only 100. Firm A holds a minority 25 percent stake in firm B. Firm
B holds a minority stake of 22 percent in firm C. Firm C holds a
minority stake of 18 percent in firm D. Through a combination of
managerial and shareholder allegiances in each firm, firm A can de
facto control firms B, C, and D. The family's ultimate economic claim
on firm D is only V(D)= 25, constituting 2.5 percent ownership stake.
Yet it controls 20 percent of votes in firm D: direct holding of 2 percent
and indirectly through firm C of 18 percent. When added with
98
managerial and other shareholder alliances, these minority stakes
can result in de facto control.
99
When
This domino arrangement of crossholding is pernicious.
value
firm
total
a
has
group
corporate
the
calculated,
are
all shares
96
own
collectively
shareholders
nonfamily
and
Public
of 1,700.

98.

Like

royalty

in

monarchical

societies,

interchaebol alliances through marriage. See

chaebol

CUMINGS,

families

create

supra note 49, at 327

(noting that 31 out of the 33 largest firms have interchaebol connections through
marriage, and that Samsung and Hyundai have connubial ties). Additionally, a
key shareholder in corporate Korea and frequent ally of families is the National
Pension Service, which is one of the largest single shareholders in the world and
See infra notes 261-62 and
a Korean state-controlled pension fund.
accompanying text.

99. American corporate law precludes certain kinds of voting in crossshareholdings where the corporation controls the votes of an entity. See DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 160 (2020); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.21(b) (2016). The
comment to MBCA § 7.21 provides: "if the voting power is exercised by someone
acting on behalf of the corporation or by a member of management of the
corporation, a court could find that the shares otherwise belong to the
corporation, and are not entitled to vote under section 7.21."
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percent of the corporate group and the family owns only 4 percent.
But the family is the controlling shareholder. If this corporate group
was arranged as a hierarchical holding company, the family would be
an activist shareholder, a seat at the table of corporate influence
perhaps, but hardly a controlling shareholder.100
The stylized example shows the potential for abuse and the lack
of transparency. The reality is much more complex and murky. The
following is the corporate group structure of the SK chaebol around
the time of a failed hostile takeover attempt by a foreign investor, as
reported by Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor in 2005.101
FIGURE 2.

SK CHAEBOL
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Ten years later, the basic dynamics of the chaebol crossshareholding system have not changed. Below is the simplified
corporate group structure of the Samsung chaebol, as reported by the
Wall Street Journalin 2014.102

100. See Robert J. Rhee, CorporateShort-Termism and Intertemporal Choice,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 496, 554 n.266 (2018).
101. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAw & CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

AROUND THE WORLD 115 fig. 6.1 (2008).
102. Aaron Back, Samsung Restructuring Could Offer Opportunities:
Hospitalization of PatriarchLee Kun-hee Raises Expectations for Changes to
Chaebol,
WALL
ST.
J.
(June
17,
2014,
12:38
AM),
https://www.wsj .com/articles/samsung-restructuring-could-offer-opportunities-

1402849806. This structure is a simplified version. The Samsung chaebol is
composed of sixty-seven companies, including seventeen public companies, and
accounts for about 26 percent of the total capital of the Korean stock market.
Chun, supra note 54, at 180.
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FIGURE 3. SAMSUNG CHAEBOL
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Samsung Electronics is the key firm and is family controlled. At
that time, the Lee family owned directly or indirectly less than 7
percent of Samsung Electronics, the crown jewel of the group. Yet, it
controls the group. If there is any doubt as to the family's control,
consider these astonishing recent events. The third generation heir
was convicted of bribing then-president of the country, Geun Hye
103
The bribery was
Park, and was sentenced to five years in prison.
part of a larger corruption scandal that resulted in Park's
impeachment and removal in 2017 and subsequent conviction and
twenty-five-year prison sentence. 104 With respect to the company
heir, the Korean courts reduced his sentence by half and suspended
the remaining sentence. 1 05 Upon his release, he resumed his role in

103. Choe Sang-Hun et al., Samsung Verdict Sends a Tough New Message to
South Korea Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
08/25/business/samsung-bribery-embezzlement-conviction-j ay-lee- southkorea.html.
104. Choe Sang Hun, Park Geun-hye, Ex-South Korean Leader, Gets 25 Years
in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/
world/asia/park-geun-hye-sentenced-south-korea.html. See supra note 66.
105. See Choe Sang-Hun & Raymond Zhong, Samsung Heir Freed, to Dismay
of South Korea's Anti-Corruption Campaigners, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/samsung-lee-jae-yongappeal.html ("When ... the de facto leader of Samsung, walked free on Monday
after spending barely a year in jail, it reaffirmed a pattern South Koreans have
fought for decades to break: Business tycoons convicted of corruption here hardly
spend any time behind bars."). However, as of the writing of this article, the saga
continues as the Korean Supreme Court ordered a retrial on the corruption
charge, but then the lower court rejected a prosecutor's arrest warrant. See
Elizabeth Koh, South Korean Court Denies Arrest Warrant for Samsung's Lee
Jae-Yong, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2020, 3:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
south-korean-court-denies-arrest-warrant-for-samsungs-lee-j ae-yong11591641310; Kim Tong-Hyung, Samsung Heir Lee Appears in Court for
https://apnews.com/
(Oct. 24, 2019),
Corruption Retrial, AP NEWS
e8155fc8f4df44ce9ca7df532c6f7330.
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the company. 106 In the American context, it would be implausible to
permit a manager with a small ownership stake to continue the
leadership of a public company upon release from prison for a serious
felony.10 7 Korea does not impose a character and fitness requirement
for leaders of public companies. 108
The passing of corporate leadership to male descendants of
founding patriarchs is simply assumed, something akin to patrilineal
title.10 9 Recently, the corporate market has suddenly undergone
transformationalleadership change. In addition to the above noted
change at Samsung, generational transfer of control occurred at
Hyundai,110 the second largest Korean chaebol, and the LG Group,
the fourth largest chaebol.
The public statements of LG are
illuminating.
Upon the death of the chairman in 2018,111 the
company issued this statement: "Under the owner family's strict
principle of handing over the leadership to the eldest son, the

106. Timothy W. Martin & Eun-Young Jeong, Samsung Heir Emerges from
Prison to Chart Giant's New Course, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2018, 10:44 PM),
https://www.wsj .com/articles/samsung-heir-lee-jae-yong-to-be-freed-from-prisonby-appeals-court-1517813046.
107.

Cf. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, LITIGATION RELEASE

No. 19794, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic Settle SEC's Insider Trading
Charges, SEC Press Release (Aug. 7, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2006/2006-134.htm (providing that Stewart agreed to a five-year bar from serving
as a director, officer or employee of a public company).
108. American law in various related fields have devices to remove corporate
leaders based on character and fitness. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 248(f) (2018) (banking);
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (banking); 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)
(securities); Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f) (2018)
(securities); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225(c) (2019) (corporate); see generally Jayne
W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59
Bus. LAw. 391 (2004) (describing the SEC's power to bar officers for fraudulent
activities following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley); Renee M. Jones, Unfit for
Duty: The Officer and DirectorBar as a Remedy for Fraud, 82 U. CINN. L. REV.
439 (2013) (describing the process and power to bar officers and directors from
their roles).
109.

See HAN-KYUNG RHO, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

REFORMS IN KOREA 53 fig. 5.2 (2007) (showing the heredity passage of
chairmanship among the biggest chaebols). Unfortunately, in addition to a
patrilineal line of control, the composition of Korean corporate boards is virtually
all male. See Joongi Kim, Korea, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 302 (Bruce Aronson & Joongi Kim, eds., 2019) ("Korea
has the lowest proportion of women at listed companies. In 2016, among the ten
largest chaebols, only 1.7 percent of the directors were women.").
110. See Cho Chung-un, Is Hyundai Motor TransferringLeadership to Heir?,
INVESTOR (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:12 PM), http://www.theinvestor.co.kr/view.php?
ud=20171206000906 (noting the third-generation transfer of control to the fortyseven-year old only son of Hyundai Motor chairman who controls the chaebol with
a 7 percent stake in Hyundai Mobis).
111. Song Su-hyun, Koo Bon-moo, Chairmanof LG Group, Dies at 73, KOREA
HERALD (May 20, 2018, 6:00 PM), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?
ud=20180520000077.
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112
His 40-year old son, the
chairman's son . .. is joining the board."
fourth generation, had been an executive for only five years at the
time. The chairman's younger brother, a 67-year old executive and
the vice-chairman, resigned to pave the way to the son's succession,
consistent with company tradition designed "to prevent a feud among
members of the owner family and back the eldest son to secure stable
management rights." 113 Samsung, LG, and Hyundai are public
corporations operating on a global scale. Their shares are owned by
Absent a
the aggregate of unaffiliated public shareholders.
114
it is
mechanism for de jure control, such as dual class stocks,
inconceivable that in the American system a small minority owner
115
can institute dynastic control over public corporations.
Control by the chaebol families has been a profound policy
quandary. The well-known problems are three. First, Korea has had
a long, infamous history of public corruption tied to chaebol and
family business interests. 116 Most civilian presidents have been
tainted by corruption either directly or through family and
affiliates. 117 The last two former presidents, Geun Hye Park (20132017) and Myung Bak Lee (2008-2013), were convicted of misdeeds,
including corrupt dealings with certain chaebols, and they are

112. See Song Su-hyun, LG Group Speeds Up Leadership Succession Process,
KOREA HERALD (May 17, 2018, 4:20 PM), http://www.koreaherald.comlview.php?
ud=20180517000670 (describing leadership "inheritance process from the third
generation of the owner family to the fourth generation" in light of the imminent
passing of his father).
113. Shin Ji-hye, LG to FaceNew Management Centeringon Koo's Son, KOREA
HERALD (May 20, 2018, 6:07 PM), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?

ud=20180520000209.

114. An example of an American outlier is the Ford Motor Co. See Deepa
Seetharaman, Ford Chairman Nearly Doubles Stake in Supervoting SharesFiling, REUTERS (June 26, 2013, 5:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/autosford-family/ford-chairman-nearly-doubles-stake-in-supervoting-shares-filingidUSL2N0F219I20130626 ("Class B shares [held by the Ford family] make up
less than 2 percent of outstanding Ford Shares, but hold 40 percent of voting
power.").

115. In the United States, dynastic control could be achieved through dual
class stock. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of SmallMinority Controllers, 107 GEo. L.J. 1453 (2019) (discussing the problem of
minority shareholders exercising control over the majority through dual class
stocks). But Korea prohibits the use of dual class stock due to the principle of
"one share, one vote." Chanho Park, Commercial Law, in INTRODUCTION TO
KOREAN LAw, supra note 58, at 194. Indeed, dual class stocks would permit
perpetual, irredeemable control of major Korean firms in the hands of a few
families, a disastrous outcome for the Korean economy, which explains why
Korean corporate law does and would not permit it.
116. See Denyer & Kim, supra note 22 (noting "high-level corruption and
collusion between the political elite and the powerful business sector").
117. After the Korean War, military dictators ruled the nation. The first
civilian president was Young-sam Kim (1993-1998).
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currently serving lengthy prison sentences. 11 8 These kinds of
prosecutions are not outliers, and a majority of past presidents have
been tainted by corruption.1 19
Second, families use control to engage in tunneling.120 Tunneling
occurs when controlling persons "use their power to divert value at
the expense of the company and its public investors." 12 1 These kinds
of practices include favorable purchase or sale of assets or stock,
rigged transactions for personal benefit, propped up personal
ventures with corporate funds, and excessive compensation. 122 The
low valuations in the Korean market reflect value diversion from
public shareholders to families.1 23
Third, the Korean economy has monopolistic and oligopolistic
traits. Chaebols control large parts of the country's production,
employment, and economic prospect.1 24 A few brands dominate the
economy.125 For example, while the Samsung brand is commonly
associated with electronics, the chaebol operates businesses in real
estate, securities, insurance, amusement parks, biological products,
and shipping.1 26 The economy is undiversified, geared toward export
of higher-end capital goods such as ships, steel, automobiles, and
electronics. 127

Each of these problems arising from family control of corporate
groups alone would be a major quandary for law and governance.
Together, they pose a fundamental structural problem that pervades
the nation's entire social-political-economic fabric.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES

The frontline rules designed to mitigate managerial agency cost
are the concepts of fiduciary duty, enforcement for breach, board
118. See Denyer & Kim, supra note 22.
119. See Sofia Lotto Persio, South Korean Presidents All Seem to Suffer
Turbulent Downfalls-ParkGeun-Hye Is No Exception, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/south-korean-presidents-all-seem-end-dead-orcourt-874613; Kim Tong-Hyung, South Korea's History of Bad Presidential
Endings Grows, AP NEws (Apr. 6, 2018), https://apnews.com/f4de2c758f70450583
bdf1539e3fa3bd/South-Korea's-history-of-bad-presidential-endings-grows.
120. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 101, at 110; Kee-Hong Bae et al.,
Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups,
57 J. FIN. 2695, 2695 (2002); The KoreaDiscount: Corporate GovernanceExplains
South Korea's Low Stockmarket Ratings, supra note 43.
121. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and
ControllingShareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1280 (2017).
122. Id.
123. See Pak, supra note 47, at 96-97; Pritchard, supra note 56, at 82; infra
Subpart IV.A.
124. Ramon J. Aldag, Chaebol, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/chaebol.
125. Id.
126. Affiliate
Companies,
SAMSUNG,
https://sgsg.samsung.com/main/
newpage.php?f id=samsungcompanies (last visited July 28, 2020).
127. PREMACK, supranote 25, at 3.
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1 28
Over time, American law
independence, and shareholder primacy.
and opportunism of
cost
agency
has developed ways to mitigate
129
to be modeled on
said
is
law
Although Korean
controlling persons.
practiced.
and
stated
American corporate law, they differ as

A.

FiduciaryDuties and Liability

Directors are fiduciaries and owe duties. Those duties are the
130
The scope, terms, and
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
jurisdictions. Korean
across
differ
may
duties
the
of
conditions
Act ("KCA"),131 is
Commercial
the
in
largely
situated
corporate law,
from American
part
in
borrow
to
is
said
and
statute-based
heavily
132
closely. In
track
rules
American
and
Korean
aspects,
some
In
law.
other matters, they differ fundamentally.
Under the American scheme, the duty of care is unlike the
substantive standard of care under tort law. Tort law imposes a
substantive standard of care; a doctor or a driver must act in
accordance with a standard of care, usually the reasonable person
under the circumstances. 133 Corporate duty of care is not substantive
134
If a
care, but is a duty to be informed when exercising judgment.
decision is made on an informed basis, courts do not judge the quality
or substance of a board's business judgment, no matter how poor that
judgment was.13 5
To encourage business venturing and risk-taking, American law
limits the liability of managers. The business judgment rule is the
principal rule limiting the liability of directors. It operates as "a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the
company."1 36 Absent a rebuttal of the presumption, the rule precludes

&

128. See John Armour et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and
Enforcement 1-13 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion
Paper No. 644, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/
papers/pdf/Kraakman-644.pdf.
129. Id. at 1-3.
130. See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundationof Duty of Care and Business
Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1145-46 (2013).
131. COMMERCIAL ACT, Act No. 1000, Jan. 20, 1962, amended by Act No.
10696, May 23, 2011 (S. Kor.), translatedin Korea Legislation Research Institute
37 27
1
online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/engservice/lawView.do?hseq=
lang=ENG.
132. Ko, supranote 1, at 9.
133. See Rhee, supranote 130, at 1158.
134. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
135. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
136. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See Bernard Sharfman,
The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUs. 27, 29
(2017).
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judicial review of business decisions.1 37 The rule complements the
statutory authority of the board to manage the business and
affairs.138
The Korean duty of care is different. Directors "shall execute
their duties with such care as is required of good managers" and, if
they neglect their duties under the statute or the articles of
incorporation, they shall be jointly and severally liable for
damages.1 39 The duty of care encompasses substantive negligence
and a director's failure to comply with the obligations under Korean
corporate law.1 40
The KCA does not establish a form of the business judgment
rule.141 Scholars have commented that Korean courts have adopted
or applied some form of the rule,14 2 but disagree on the scope of the
rule. 143 In the United States, the rule is intricate in application. 144
Statutory silence means that Korean courts, which are civil law
courts, must work out the intricacies in case-by-case adjudications.
This is problematic. Derivative suits are infrequent.145 The legal
boundaries of the rule are not tested. An inherent tension with the
statute exists because the KCA incorporates concepts of substantive
negligence and poor decisions. 146 Because the fundamental principle
of the business judgment rule is the preclusion of judicial review of
substantive decision-making, 147 the American rule transplants
awkwardly onto the Korean scheme. In a civil law jurisdiction,
statutory guidance on the contours of the business judgment rule is

&

137. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (commenting that a decision characterized as "'stupid' to 'egregious' or
'irrational', provides no ground for director liability").
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019); Citron v. Fairchild Camera
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
139. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 399 (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.); CIVIL ACT, Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act No. 8720, Dec.
21, 2007, arts. 61, 65 (S. Kor.), translatedin Korea Legislation Research Institute
online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/engservice/lawView.do?hseq=45912&
lang-ENG.
140. E.g., COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 393 (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.) (power to dispose or transfer assets, borrow large scale assets,
appoint or dismiss managers, manage all affairs of the corporation); id. art. 4082 (power to appoint or dismiss an executive director and supervise the executive
director); id. art. 412-2 (duty to "immediately report" to its auditor "any fact that
is likely to inflict a substantial loss").
141. JEEHYE YOU, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA 115 (2015).

142. Kim & Park, supra note 5, at 8; Pak, supra note 47, at 98; You, supra
note 141, at 116.
143. YoU, supranote 141.
144. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009); Rhee, supranote
130, at 1148.
145. See infra note 212 and Subpart II.B.
146. The American rule by contrast emphasizes informedness in decisionmaking. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
147.

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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preferred, lest there is ad hoc deference or not by courts that must
148
Judicial rulings could and do
rule without statutory guidance.
149
incorporate unstated factors that may affect outcomes.
Under Korean law, directors could be sued for making ill-advised
150
decisions or failure to execute all obligations under the statute.
Such a case may be in the milieu of political or public
condemnation. 151 A judgment of liability under these conditions may
disincentivize risk-taking. 152 Personal liability may result in risk
153
However, some degree of risk
aversion, which diminishes profit.
aversion in the Korean situation may be rational. If diversification is
154
feasible, risk neutrality is better because it maximizes returns.
The Korean economy is not as diversified and is concentrated in a few
large enterprises. 155 It is more sensitive to large bad outcomes. The
misfortune of a large firm would have traumatic effect on any society.
But the collapses of Enron and Daewoo probably had different effects
in their countries. 156 To some degree, risk aversion may make sense
when risk is concentrated and cannot be diversified in a large market,
157
and its manifestation would have broad social impact.
The Korean duty of care may reflect a reasoned policy preference
American law may
to incentivize prudent decision-making.
irrational"15 8 actions
or
countenance a manager's "stupid to egregious
to advance the specific policy of risk-taking while relying on an array
of monitoring and market mechanisms to achieve good aggregate
148. See Rhee, supra note 130, at 1147-48.
149. For example, Korean courts have cited the potential adverse impact on
the national economy as justification for leniency given to chaebol families in
criminal and regulatory actions. See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 334 ("Courts
acted similarly. Even when they found chaebol executives guilty, they routinely
commuted their sentences based upon 'enormous contributions to the economy."');
Tong-Hyung, supranote 105 (noting that business leaders convicted of corruption
"often received relatively light punishment with judges often citing ramifications
to the country's economy").
150. Johneth Chongseo Park & Doo-Ah Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: A
Missing Piece in the Developing Puzzle of Korean CorporateGovernance Reform,
3 J. KOREAN L. 15, 45 (2003).
151. Id. at 23-25.
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id. at 15.
154.

See ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 138

(2d ed. 2016).
155. See supranotes 124-25 and accompanying text.
156. Daewoo was a prominent chaebol before it collapsed and imposed
significant effects on Korean society. See generally Joongi Kim, supra note 17
(discussing Daewoo's corporate governance and subsequent downfall).
157. Korea is not alone in meeting these qualifications. Even the United
States, the most sophisticated economy in the world, learned that risk can be
concentrated, undiversifiable, and profoundly consequential, as was the case in
the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
158. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
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outcomes. On the other hand, Korean law may rationally prefer a
policy that says, in effect, "don't take stupid risks and tank our
economy."1 59 Endogenous factors determine the rule. American rules
of duty of care and business judgment are better suited for a large
market that has various legal and economic accountability
mechanisms. Korean rules may reflect a public preference for some
risk aversion to avoid a problematic moral hazard.1 60 Otherwise, the
private costs of bad decisions by families could be externalized to the
public fisc in light of past government support of chaebols.
With respect to the duty of loyalty, American and Korean rules
track more closely.1 6 1 In the United States, a controlling shareholder
owes a duty of loyalty to minority shareholders.1 6 2 In determining
control, American courts in equity reject formalism in favor of
pragmatism. 163 They look past layers of entities to reach the actual
controlling person. 164 There is no bright line rule for determining de
facto control.1 65 Whether one controls the corporation is contextual,
depending on an inquiry of actual control. 166
Korean law mirrors American rules. A person can be a de facto
director if he or she instructs a director by "using his/her influence
over the company."1 67 A director can be a major shareholder, defined
as one who owns 10 percent of outstanding shares or "exerts de facto
influence on important matters related to the management of the
listed company." 168 Of course, the question of "actual control" or "de

159. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
161. Kim & Park, supra note 142, at 4 n.11 (stating that many Korean
scholars opine that Korean corporate law adopted the American concept of duty
of loyalty); see Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (discussing the
reason for loyalty to a corporation).
162. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014).
163. See Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1280 (Del. 2007); Schnell v. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1991).
164. E.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1919) (holding that
shareholder of parent company that is the controlling shareholder of the
downstream corporation owed fiduciary duty to the downstream shareholders);
In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. Ch. 1991) (holding that directors
of the corporate general partner of a limited partnership owed fiduciary duty
directly to the limited partnership).
165. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del. 1994).
166. Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 668 (Del. Ch. 2012).
167. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 401-2 (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.); see Kim, supra note 109, at 304 ("Technically, a controlling shareholder
participating in the business of a company by, for instance, instructing a director
or holding a title of authority such as chair or president can be deemed a de facto
director and held liable to the company and third persons, but this rarely
occurs."); Ko, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that family members can be deemed to
be de facto directors "while, in the past, they could manage their companies
without holding any official titles or assuming any legal responsibilities").
168. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 542-8(2) (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.).
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facto influence" are factual inquiries determined case by case,
assuming an effective litigation system and broad access to courts.
Directors and de facto directors are prohibited from competing
17 0
misappropriating business
with the company, 169 self-dealing,
171
and engaging in bad faith. 172 These prohibitions fit
opportunities,
the Korean circumstance well. The enforcement of the duty of loyalty
should, in theory, curb the abuses in the chaebol system. With respect
to bad faith, the history of Korean business is replete with public
corruption and bribery at all levels. 173 Under American principles,
174
Korea has
violations of positive law are bad faith and disloyal acts.
dealt with these problems through criminal law as it should, but
corporate law should play a role by equating corruption with bad faith
subject to liability for disloyalty.
American law permits the exculpation of personal liability for a
175
breach of the duty of care, but not for a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Korean law is similar in principle. It imposes liability for a breach of
17 6
Director
the duty of care, but caps damages to a reasonable limit.
liability is limited to six times annual compensation (three times for
outside directors). 177 This limitation of liability is not permitted for a
breach of the duty of loyalty.178
Lastly, Korean and American corporate laws diverge with respect
to duties to nonshareholders. Under American law, fiduciary duties
run to the corporation and shareholders in solvent firms and not to
third parties. 179 Under Korean law, third parties may sue a director

Id. art. 397.
Id. art. 398.
Id. art. 397-2.
Id. art. 382-3.
Kim, supra note 58, at 92; e.g., Kim Da-sol, Court's Ruling Unexpected:
PM),
11:54
13,
2018,
(Feb.
HERALD
KOREA
Group,
Lotte
Kim
So-hyun,
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180 2 13 0 0 0 9 8 8 ;
Probe Underway on More Bribery Allegations Linked to ex-President Lee, KOREA
HERALD (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:10 PM), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?
ud=20180228000553.
174. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2011); Metro Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm
Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131, 163-64 (Del. Ch. 2004). See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (citing an example of bad faith when
"the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law"). Korean
courts embrace the same concept. Kim & Park, supranote 142, at 11 (noting that
in Case No. 2003-Da69638 (Oct. 28, 2005), the court rejected the idea that bribery
on behalf of the company can get business judgment protection).
175. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2019); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787
A.2d 85, 96 (Del. 2001).
176. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 400(2) (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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jointly and severally for damages if the director "has neglected to
perform his/her duties intentionally or by gross negligence."180 Duties
also run to the public at large. Chapter VII of the KCA provides
criminal penalties related to corporate actions. 181 Certain provisions
are uncontroversial, such as conduct based on fraud, theft, or
corruption. 182 But crimes in Korea also include breaching the duty of
loyalty, 183 engaging in speculative transactions, 184 and violating
formal requirements of corporate law. 18 5 Such provisions have no
counterpart in American law. A mere breach of the duty of loyalty
based on opportunism, such as self-dealing transactions, 186 or a
failure to perform duties, such as complying with rules on issuance of
shares,187 are not inherently criminal acts.
B.

Board Independence and ShareholderActions

American and Korean rules largely agree on the general conduct
that would breach the duty of loyalty. The real difference lies not in
the letter of the law, but in practice and internalization. In both
countries, "board capture" can be a real problem. In the United
States, the problem of board capture occurs at the hands of senior
executives. 188 In Korea, it occurs at the hands of controlling
families.1 89 In the presence of controlling shareholders, two devices
elicit good governance and board compliance with the ideals of
fiduciary duty. 190
One prophylactic against controlling person abuse is an
independent board structure and corporate culture. 191 Independent

180. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 401 (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.); see Bernard Black et al., Shareholder Suits Against Korean Directors,
in KOREAN BUSINESS LAw, supra note 5, at 35 (noting the "unusual" aspect of third

parties having rights to enforce a director's duties).
181. COMMERCIAL ACT, ch. VII (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019) (S.
Kor.).
182. See, e.g., id. arts. 628, 630, 631, & 634.
183. Id. art. 622 ("any pecuniary benefit by acting in breach of his/her duty").
184. Id. art. 625 ("disposed of the company's assets for speculative
transactions").
185. Id. art. 629 ("issued shares in excess of the total number of shares
authorized"); id. art. 635 (listing various administrative and compliance
violations under corporate law).
186. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
187. E.g., Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1137-38 (Del. 1990).
188. See Robert J. Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoringof Executive Compensation, 69
VAND. L. REV. 695, 706 (2016).
189. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 101102, at 118 ("Loyalty to the
founder was rewarded in a variety of ways, and the lack of an active market for
managerial talent reinforced allegiance to the group. By contrast, directors and
[statutory] auditors felt little accountability toward shareholders.").
190. See Chun, supra note 5454, at 184-86; Jill E. Fisch, The PeculiarRole of
the Delaware Courts in the Competitionfor CorporateCharters,68 U. CIN. L. REV.
1061, 1090 (2000).
191. See Chun, supra note 5454, at 184-86.
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directors are important because they are said to not be beholden to
controlling persons. 192 Korea adopted the concept of an independent
194
director from American law, 193 but its efficacy is mixed at best.
Corporate cultures and social norms in each country are unique. They
produce pros and cons when applied to specific social problems. The
corporate system in Korea is influenced by the Confucian tradition of
195
The larger sociohierarchy, which is strong in Korean society.
cultural environment and the rigidity of strict hierarchy in a chaebol
system beget a corporate culture where directors are less
independent.196

When examining board independence, one must distinguish legal
structure and culture. Structure is a legal concept and it is easily
installed through the stroke of a lawmaker's pen. Both Korea and the
United States mandate a majority of independent directors in public
192. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 818 (Del. 2019); Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 648-49 (Del. 2014).
193. "Outside director" is the Korean term for an independent director. Chun,
supra note 54, at 190. "[U]nder the KCC, independent directors must be
independent from the company in all respects including ownership, kinship,
employment and business relations." See COMMERCIAL ACT art. 382(3) (Korea
Legislation Research Institute 2019) (S. Kor.); Chun, supra note 54, at 194. The
concept of an independent director was previously nonexistent in Korea. It is a
legal transplant from American corporate law. Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim,
Varieties of Independent Directors in Asia, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A
HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH, supra note 54, at 89-91.

The primary expected function of an independent director in Korea is to monitor
controlling shareholders. Id. at 111.
194. Pritchard, supra note 56, at 95; Black et al., supra note 12, at 557. The
concept of an independent director has been ineffective in Korea. See infra note
357.
195. One cannot understand Korean society without an appreciation of
Confucianism, a social philosophy that originated from China and that is deeply
embraced in Korea.
The Confucian system is built on five relationships: father/teacher and
son (filial piety is the most important of all virtues), ruler and subject,
husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, and friend and
friend. Three of the five concern the family, which is the building block
The
of society and is organized on authoritarian principles ....
traditional Confucian society was aristocratic, authoritarian, and
static. Hierarchy was the dominant feature, and the five basic
relationships tended to keep people in their places ....
LAWRENCE

E. HARRISON,

WHO PROSPERS:

How CULTURAL VALUES

SHAPE

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUCCESS 82-83 (1992). See Dwight H. Perkins, Law,
Family Ties, and the East Asian Way of Business, in CULTURE MATTERS: How
VALUES SHAPE PROGRESS 232, 233-34 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P.

Huntington eds., 2000); see also Kim, supra note 20, at 127-28
role of Confucian philosophy in Korean corporate governance and
"controlling shareholder would command the obedience and
employees"). Korean society is more Confucian than even China.

(describing the
noting that the
loyalty of all
See FUKUYAMA,

supra note 69, at 131; MICHAEL SCHUMAN, CONFUCIUS AND THE WORLD HE
CREATED 70 (2015).

196.

See Kim, supra note 20, at 127-28.
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companies. 197 Korean corporate law goes a step further. It statutorily
designates a monitor called an "auditor," who is distinct from an
independent financial auditor.198 The statutory auditor, in theory, is
an additional layer of independent oversight and acts as a supermonitor over the board.1 99 The auditor must be independent of the
board and managers. 2 00 In the letter of the law, the auditor has
"powerful authority" 201: the power to "audit directors' performance of
duties[,] ... request a director to report on relevant business[,] and
inspect the affairs and financial conditions of a company." 202 But the
concept of an all-powerful super-monitor is ineffective in practice.
The audit system under the Commercial Act is unique and rare
in other countries. But it is unfortunate that the audit system
in the past was merely a system existing only on the Act.
Auditors were not active in a company and powerless. It was
common to see auditors present at a general meeting to just

read a report that was prepared by a company. They failed to
check the management as expected by the Commercial Act. 203
Well-intentioned laws can be written, but are not effective because
they are either not enforced or never internalized. 204 The much
tougher nut to crack on independence is board culture.2 05

197. COMMERCIAL ACT art. 542-8(1) (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.) (requiring a majority of the board of a Korean public company be
"outside directors"); NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL rule

303A.01 (2009); THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES rule 5605(b)(1) (2006);
Puchniak & Kim, supra note 193, at 116.
198. Dongho Lee, Corporations, in KOREAN BUSINESS LAw: THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE AND BEYOND, supra note 47, at 85-86.

199. See COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 412 (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.); Park, supra note 115, at 203.
200. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 411 (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.).
201. Park, supra note 115, at 203.
202. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 412 (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.). The statutory auditor has other expansive legal powers. See id. art.
412-2 (directors to report likelihood of substantial loss to auditors); id. art. 4123 (power to convene an extraordinary shareholder meeting); id. art. 412-4 (power
to demand board meeting); id. art. 412-5 (power to investigate subsidiary
company); id. art. 413 (power to examine agenda items and documents to be
submitted to shareholders).
203. Park, supra note 115115, at 204. See Kim, supra note 20, at 131 (noting
that the statutory auditor "failed to perform their role as internal watchdogs that
monitored board and management decisions"); MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note

101, at 102 (noting that the statutory auditor "did not operate effectively as a
check on management").
204. See Robert D. Cooter, The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State:
Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundationsof Development, in ANNUAL WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 191, 191-92, 195, 198, 201-02
(Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1996).
205. See Pritchard, supra note 56, at 95 ("A more daunting challenge for
reformers, however, is cultural rather than legal."). Cf. Peter Molk, The Puzzling
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Although board capture by executives is a reality, the United
206
States is further developed in the culture of board independence.
It is conceivable that due to the limitation of factfinding in
adjudications, boards in both countries meet all legal definitions of
independence and yet are in fact beholden or loyal to controlling
individuals. But the idea of independence in the United States has
been internalized. 207 Strong evidence of this is the routineness of
CEO firings. 208 In Korea, the concept of independence is not firmly
rooted in Korean corporate governance. 20 9 Families are not fired by
the board; rather, the typical board and management are beholden to
the patron family. 210
Another prophylactic against controlling shareholder agency cost
is derivative litigation. Much of American corporate law on fiduciary
211
In Korea, a less
duties is developed through the common law.
2 12
shareholders could, in theory, become
litigious society generally,
2 13
It
powerful monitors. But derivative actions in Korea are few.
denies standing to most shareholders. For public companies, only
shareholders holding at least 0.01 percent (1/10,000) of shares can
bring a derivative suit (e.g., a holding of $100,000 for a mid-cap
2 14
Only institutional
company with $1 billion market capitalization).
shareholders can feasibly bring a derivative suit against most midand large-cap companies. 2 15 This rule is not egalitarian and shuts the
216
The American rule is
courthouse doors to all retail investors.
217
It relies on a
liberal and does not impose such restriction.

Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REv. 899, 933-35 (2014) (noting the link between
economics, culture, and organizational law).
206. See Michael Klausner, Fact or Fiction in CorporateLaw and Governance,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1357-58 (2013).
207. Id.
208. See Jeanne Sahadi, Up to Half of Exiting CEOs Don't Quit. They Get
Fired, CNN Bus. (July 19, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/19/
success/ceos-getting-fired/index.html; see also Klausner, supranote 206, at 1358
(noting that independent boards do well at firing underperforming CEOs).
209. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210. See Chun, supra note 5454, at 179-80.
211. See Fisch, supra note 190, at 1074.
212. See Kim & Park, supra note 142, at 12 (noting that the first derivative
action was brought in 2000).
213. See Black et al., in KOREAN BUSINESS LAw, supranote 5, at 28 (describing
the growth of derivative actions in Korea, but noting that such actions are few);
see also Kim, supra note 109, at 313 (noting that the concept of a derivative suit
was a legal transplant but that "private enforcement remains weak in Korea").
214. COMMERCIAL ACT art. 542(6) (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)

(S. Kor.).
215. See Black et al., in KOREAN BUSINESS LAw, supra note 5, at 36-37.
216. See id.
217. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2019) (plaintiff must have been a
stockholder at the time of the subject transaction); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.41
(2016).
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privatized form of enforcement of essential duties. 218 Because any
recovery belongs to the corporation, the real party of interest (thus
the actual monitor) is the plaintiff's attorney. 219 To disincentivize
derivative actions further, Korean law provides no real economic
incentive in terms of attorney fees and costs. 2 2 0 A plaintiff may
recover "cost incurred in relation to the action" but this does not
include attorney fees, and such costs are recoverable only when the
shareholder "wins the case." 221 Under Delaware law, a court may
provide attorney fees if the plaintiff shareholder's suit provided a
substantial benefit to the corporation. 222 Given the barriers to
litigation in Korea, one is not surprised at all that the derivative
action there is not a serious tool to hold wayward fiduciaries
accountable and to improve corporate governance.
Unless
fundamental changes in the structure of incentives are made,
notwithstanding a few quixotic actions each year, Korea permits
derivative suits in name only.
C.

ShareholderPrimacy

Shareholder primacy is the idea that the purpose of the
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, 223 and in the United
States, it is a rule of law. 224 It is a complex rule. It is not an
enforceable fiduciary duty; there is not a single statute or case
mandating compliance upon pain of personal liability. 225 It is a
filamentary principle that weaves through the legal architecture of

218. See In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S'holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch.
1999) ("Our legal system has privatized in part the enforcement mechanism for
policing fiduciaries by allowing private attorneys to bring suits on behalf of
nominal shareholder plaintiffs.").
219. See id. ("To be sure, a real possibility exists that the economic motives of
attorneys might influence the remedy sought or the conduct of the
litigation.... [T]he attorney in pursuit of his own economic interests may usurp
the role of the plaintiff and exploit the judicial system entirely for his own private
gain.").
220. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 405(1) (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019)
(S. Kor.).
221. Id.
222. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876, 878 (Del. 1980).
E.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(stating that the plaintiffs case was "extremely weak" and thus approved a
settlement of the derivative suit on favorable terms to the defendant directors,
but awarded plaintiff's attorney fees of $869,000 in fees and costs).
223. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that ForProfit CorporationsSeek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (arguing
"corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a
good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders").
224. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of ShareholderPrimacy, 102 MINN.
L. REv. 1951, 1954 (2018) ("Shareholder primacy is not a social norm originating
from a shared belief in the community, independent of legal origin or influence.
It is law obligating managers to maximize value.").
225. Id. at 1961.
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the corporate system. 2 2 6 It is given legitimacy by systematic judicial
rulings that intricately work within the statutory framework of broad
board authority. The rule, albeit unenforceable, is efficacious. Broad
compliance is achieved by the total effect of incentives put on
managers by the architecture of the corporate system: judicial
227
the
articulation of a legal obligation in the Hartian tradition,
corporate
for
market
the
value,
stock
to
tied
pay
executive
of
structure
control, shareholder monitoring through derivative actions, and
22 8
shared norms.

Like all American corporate law statutes, the KCA is silent on
the issue of shareholder primacy. Nor have Korean courts directed
If the Korean
managers to "maximize shareholder profit."
government were to enact such a rule, there would probably be strong
populist resistance. 229 There are clear implications of a society's
embrace of the rule: e.g., layoffs, outsourcing, divestitures, market for
corporate control, rent-seeking through influencing of public policy,
2 0
and minimal compliance with laws. 3 Although these traits are
commonly seen in the American market, the average Korean would
find these strategies objectionable. 231 Shareholder primacy dictates
that the manager should pursue all legal means to maximize
shareholder profit. 232
233
The rule
Shareholder primacy is not a rule of law in Korea.
requires a complex legal architecture that does not exist: executive
compensation is not substantially tied to stock value; a market for
corporate control is limited; shareholder monitoring is inert; no legal

.

226. Id. at 1999.
227. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (3d ed. 2012)
(articulating a theory of legal positivism)
228. See Rhee, supra note 224, at 2011-13 (discussing the pathways through
which "the law and legal system writ large achieve broad compliance [with
shareholder primacy]").
229. Populist sentiments and movements can affect the direction of corporate
law and governance. See generally ROE, supra note 35 (discussing the role of
populism in the structure of corporate ownership and capital markets).
230. See Rhee, supra note 224, at 1961 ("As a conceptual matter, a rulesanction framework of a duty to maximize profit presents an irreconcilable
conflict between authority and accountability because profit-seeking is the core
managerial function in a business corporation.").
231. See RHO, supra note 109, at xxi (discussing how the rise of shareholder
activism in Korea was not at first particularly favorable).
232. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch.
2010) (requiring companies to "maximize the economic value of a for-profit
Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders").
233. See Sang Yop Kang, Tension Between ShareholderPrimacy and (Quasi)
Monopoly: A Theoretical Analysis of Controlling Shareholder Economies and
China, 11 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 128, 139-40 (2015) (discussing how Korea came
close to a shareholder primacy system after the Asian market suffered in 1997).
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pronouncement, neither statute nor ruling, has been stated. 234 The
incentive mechanisms that elicit compliance with an unenforceable
rule do not exist. There is not even a strong norm because the
principle of shareholder primacy may conflict with broadly-shared
Korean ethos. 235
Korean rules substantially support the view that the country
embraces a stakeholder concept of corporate purpose. 236 Directors
owe duties to the corporation, but not to shareholders. 237 They owe
duties to third parties under corporation law and the public at large
through the criminal provisions in the corporate law. 238 The Korean
government actively manages the national economy to promote
egalitarian social welfare. 239 The Korean Constitution endows the
government with the authority to promote a democratized
economy. 240 Shareholder primacy is more prevalent and robust in
markets where product competition is strong, as is the case of the
American market. 241 The Korean market is characterized by industry
concentration,
dominance by chaebols, and weak internal
competition. 242 Shareholder primacy does not and cannot exist in the
strong form seen in the United States. The systematic discounting of
the values of Korean companies is the convincing evidence. 243
A stronger embrace of shareholder primacy would benefit the
Korean market. The conflict between shareholder-centrism and
stakeholder theory is not irreconcilable. The two ideas can coexist, if
uneasily, as they did in the United States for many years before the
1980s when shareholder primacy began to dominate theory and was
234. Id.; see Rhee, supra note 224, at 2011-13 (discussing characteristics of a
system for shareholder primacy).
235. See RHO, supra note 109, at xxi (noting that public opinion "reveals that
most Koreans believe that business profits should be returned to the society
rather than to the shareholders").
236. See Pak, supra note 47, at 93 (suggesting that "Korea's egalitarian and
group-oriented society more naturally fit" a stakeholder theory of corporate
purpose). See also CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 317 ("[P]olitical leaders pay
attention not to efficiency and rationality but to political and, in this case,
national efficacy.... The firms that got policy loans were quasi-state
organizations that had common interests with the government .... ").
237. Park, supra note 115, at 198.
238. See supra Subpart III.A.
239. See supra note 59.
240. KOREAN CONSTITUTION, art. 34(2) (S. Kor.) ("promote social security and
welfare"); id. art. 32 (prescribing work conditions in conformity with democratic
principles); id. art. 119 ("regulate and coordinate economic affairs ... to
democratize the economy through harmony among the economic agents").
241. Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
IndustrialOrganization,149 U. PA. L. REv. 2063, 2063 (2001).
242. While chaebols are privately owned, they share certain characteristics of
state-owned enterprises, such as a strong link to the state and relegation of profit
maximization.
Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1727-31 (2009).
243. See infra Subpart IV.B.
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24 4
The
integrated into the legal architecture of the corporate system.
adoption of shareholder-centric rules would mitigate the costs
Since Korea does not have the
associated with family control.
necessary conditions to implement a strong form of the rule, and since
the government manages the national economy per its constitutional
powers, its market will not speed toward the dynamics seen in the
American corporate market if it embraces greater shareholder
protection. The Korean system has legal, institutional, cultural, and
political brakes. A fuller embrace of shareholder-centric rules and
the mechanisms necessary to implement them will make the Korean
corporate market more efficient.

IV. THE COSTS OF INEFFICIENCY

Through the prism of American principles, Korean law and
governance are flawed because they permit obvious inefficacies. The
social costs are two. Inefficient rules produce lower firm values as
capital markets price in weaknesses in corporate governance. Lower
values negatively affect the structure of wealth, entrench economic
245
classes, and ossify economic mobility in the population.
A.

Primary Cost: The "KoreanDiscount"

Ineffective corporate law and governance produce well-known
problems: empire building; suboptimal capital structure and
intragroup capital allocation; crowding out innovation and
entrepreneurism; management control by bloodline rather than.
executive talent; rent-seeking through political patronage and public
246
corruption; self-dealing and tunnelling.
Not surprisingly, Korean firms suffer from the "Korean
discount." 247 The capital markets systematically discount their
values. 248 One measure of value is the price-to-earnings (P/E)
multiple, which indicates the amount investors are willing to pay as
a multiple of annual earnings on the assumption that the firm will
244. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZo L. REV. 261, 265-66 (1992) (explaining the long
coexistence and tension between the private property and the social entity models
of the corporation).
245. See Kang, supra note 233, at 138-39 (discussing the theory that
shareholder primacy increases the value of corporations and increases efficiency).
246. See, e.g., Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 296-315 (recounting the many
internal problems at the Daewoo chaebol).
(Jan. 10, 2010, 3:50
247. Stephen G. Heckman, Korea Discount, KOREA TIMES
9 98
PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2017/0 /1 _58738.html ("The
'Korea Discount' is defined ... as 'the amount by which investors undervalue
Korean stocks."').
248. See id. ("This discount rate can be seen in how Korean stocks have
consistently maintained low price-earnings ratios, and are predicted to maintain
this low ratio in the future as well.").

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

682

[Vol. 55

continue to pay earnings indefinitely in the future. 249 According to
one recent study, Korean companies are cheap. 250
Despite being one of the wealthiest countries in the world (11th

in 2015 GDP, 30th in PPP GDP per capita) and housing some of
the world's most successful companies in Samsung, Hyundai,
and LG, members of the KOSPI index trade at an average P/E
of only 9.7. This compares with an average P/E of ~18 for
companies in the S&P 500 and NIKKEI 225, 13.7 for the
Chinese SSE Composite, and 12.5 for the Brazilian Bovespa.
Based on these data, Korean companies are discounted by 46 percent
and 29 percent compared to American and Japanese companies,
respectively. 251

Another recent account suggests that Korean companies trade at
0.8x price-to-book (P/B).252 This means that the market value of
assets net of liabilities (the market value of equity) is less than the
book value of equity. 253 Ordinarily, the P/B multiple would be greater
than 1.0. The market value of assets is higher than their book value
because the firm is expected to deploy assets such that they generate
profit beyond acquisition cost. 2 54 In ordinary situations, that is the
case. 255 The most likely explanation of a P/B multiple of less than 1.0
is that the markets anticipate the diminution of asset values in the
hands of the management in control of the firm and its assets. 256 In
other words, the firm is better off dissolving and liquidating assets
rather than continuing as a going concern because management is
expected to destroy firm value. 2 57

249. See RHEE, supra note 154, at 194 (explaining the price-to-earnings
multiple).
250. Luke Schiefelbein, Korea Is Cheap, and About to Get a Lot More
Shareholder-Friendly,
FORBES
(June
26,
2017,
10:58
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lukeschiefelbein/2017/06/26/korea-is-cheap-andabout-to-get-a-lot-more-shareholder-friendly/#5d457197425f. See Mike Bird, The
Horsemen Stalking the Korean Stock Market, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2019, 9:03
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-horsemen-stalking-the-korean-stockmarket-11567256580 (noting that Korean companies are trading at 11x forward
P/E); Heckman, supra note 247 ("The forward price-earnings ratio for Korea is
10.8. Compare this with Japan's ratio of 21.6, or even the historic average median
of the American ratio on the S&P 500 of 15.7.").
251. Scheifelbein, supra note 250.
252. Bird, supra note 250.
253. See RHEE, supra note 154, at 194-95.
254. See id. at 25-26.
255. See id. at 24-26.
256. See generally Marco Realdon, Credit Risk, Valuation and Fundamental
Analysis, 27 INT'L REv. FIN. ANALYSIS 77, 82 (2012) ("Therefore value stocks, i.e.
stocks with low price to earnings ratio and/or low price to book ratio, may have
high expected stock returns in order to compensate high credit risk.").
257. Id.
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The "Korean discount" incorporates the market view that the
258
While the
chaebol system suffers from weaknesses in governance.
discount is not entirely attributable to poor corporate governance (i.e.,
each country's risk profile is unique), inefficient laws and governance
All
contribute substantially to lower systematic firm values.
shareholders, domestic and foreign, are harmed by this system.
Secondary Cost: Economic Ossification
A secondary cost to low firm values is the downstream negative
Corporate valuations affect the
effects on the broader society.
25 9
In 2017, the personal wealth of the
structure of household wealth.
26 0
As between
average Korean was principally in real estate holdings.
real estate and financial assets, the allocation was 74.4 percent and
25.6 percent respectively. 26 1 The structure of American household
26 2
wealth is the mirror opposite.

B.

FIGURE 4. COMPARISON OF KOREA AND U.S. HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
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258. See Pritchard, supra note 56, at 83 ("[T]he stock market appears to
recognize this risk of abuse by the controlling shareholders of chaebol firms.");
The Korea Discount: Corporate Governance Explains South Korea's Low
Stockmarket Ratings, supra note 43 ("But the prime cause of the discount is more
likely to be poor corporate governance.. .. ").
259. See supraPart II.
260. The average Korean household owned real estate assets of W283.8
million and financial assets of W97.8 million (approximately $258,000 and
$89,000 under the exchange rate of W1,100 = $1.00). The Survey of Household
Finances and Living Conditions (SFLC) in 2017, STAT. KOREA 1 (Dec. 21, 2017),
http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/6/1/index.board.
261. Id.
262. Total household real estate assets were $24,511.1 billion and financial
assets were $85,271.9 billion in 2017. FinancialAccounts of the United States:
Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts, FED.
REs. STAT. RELEASE 138 (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/zl/20180920/z1.pdf.
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There is a clear social implication. The Korean real estate
market is concentrated in the greater Seoul metropolitan area
including its satellite cities, where almost half of the country's
population of about fifty million resides. 26 3 The residential real estate
market is expensive. 26 4 As one of the largest cities in the world, the
commercial real estate market is large. 26 5 Real estate tends to ossify
economic classes in Korea. 266 Those who have it tend to be richer;
those who do not tend to be poorer. 26 7 The acquisition of real estate
requires substantial capital. Korea does not have a deep market in
residential mortgages and leveraged loans. 26 8 Outside of plutocratic
families, individuals in the wealthier class in Korea are property
owners. 26 9 They are rentiers. 270 This wealth was created at the time
when Korea suddenly transitioned from post-war destitution to first
world status. 271 The wealthy came to be by the fortuitous dint of their
initial position in a country that underwent rapid economic
263. 2018 Population and Housing Census, STAT. KOREA 1 (Aug. 29, 2019),
http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/7/index.board ("As of November
1st, 2018, the population of South Korea was 51.63 million persons. The
population of the Seoul Capital Area accounted for 49.8 percent of the total
population of South Korea.").
264. See Hyunsu Yim, Seoul Housing Prices More Expensive Than London
and LA, KOREA BIZwrRE (Sept. 4, 2017) ("[H]ousing prices in Seoul are more
expensive than London and Los Angeles, considering the average household
incomes in each city.... [T]he average price for an apartment in Seoul was
estimated at 596.7 million won [about $570,000 at $1.00 = W1,050].").
265. See, e.g., Jack Sidders et al., As China Retreats from Global Property
Deals, Korea Fills The Void, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2019, 5:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-01/as-china-retreats-fromglobal-property-deals-korea-fills-void ("Korean investors splurged almost $6.8
billion on international commercial real estate in the year [2019] through
August.").
266. See Yim, supranote 264 (finding that in Seoul, "the average housing price
is over 10 times higher than the disposable income of households in the South
Korean capital ... . This means an average household in Seoul would have to
work for a decade and save up without spending a penny before buying a home.").
267. Id.
268. See Maria de Guzman, HousingPrice Slowdown in South Korea; Soaring
Prices
in
Seoul,
GLOBALPROPERTYGUIDE
5 (Mar.
12,
2019),
www.globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/South-Korea/Price-History.
By mid-2018,
the total mortgage loan in Korea was approximately W600 trillion (approximately
$570 billion at $1.00 = W1,050). Id. at 4. The average loan-to-deposit ratio was
115.16, which implies that the average equity in the home was 46%. Id. at 2.
New government regulation mandates: "Mortgages only allowed for houses worth
more than KRW 900 million (US$ 801,139) when intended for residential
purpose." Id. at 5.
269. See Yim, supra note 264.
270.

See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 331 (Arthur

Goldhammer trans., 2014) ("The first of these two ways of achieving such high
inequality is through a 'hyperpatrimonial society' (or 'society of rentiers'): a
society in which inherited wealth is very important and where the concentration
of wealth attains extreme levels . . . . The total income hierarchy is then
dominated by very high incomes from capital, especially inherited capital.").
271. See supra Part II.
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transformation. To become wealthier today, one must own real
272
Capital is not
estate, but without capital it cannot be acquired.
dynamic. These conditions create the wealth ossification trap in
Korea. 273
Economic mobility could be improved if financial assets perform
well. Earnings from wages could be invested in corporate equities as
an alternative asset class. If stocks earn sufficient rates, the economic
lot of a person without real estate could be improved through a
broader shareholder society. But corporate equities do not perform
well. Koreans have fewer investment options to invest savings and
earn suitable returns, the kind that the equity markets should
deliver. 274 Thus, concentrated wealth in the real estate sector and an
underperforming corporate sector, seemingly unrelated, are in fact
linked factors that tend to ossify economic and social classes in
Korean society. 275
V. CORPORATE LAW AS MIRROR OF ENDOGENOUS INTERESTS

The Korean corporate market is an oddity. It is open to foreign
investment. 276 It presents a trove of opportunities for activist
shareholders and hostile acquirers, more likely foreign investors, to

272.

Even the rental market requires a substantial down payment. Monthly

rent is not the typical rental arrangement. See Guzman, supra note 268, at 6
(noting that the lump-sum deposit on the typical rental arrangement is about
70% to 80% of the property value).
273. See id. at 5-6.
274.

See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 169,

172, fig. 7.3 (13th ed. 2019) (noting that from 1900 to 2017 American stocks
provided nominal returns of 11.5 percent and that some foreign countries
provided higher returns than the United States). The lack of investment
opportunities among average Koreans may explain the curious fact that Korea
was a global center of the recent Bitcoin speculation and bubble. See Jae-Hyuk
Lee & Matthew Fennell, Bitcoin in Korea: A Get-Rich-Quick Opportunity or
Another Bubble?, ASIA Soc'Y, https://asiasociety.org/korealbitcoin-korea-get-richquick-opportunity-or-another-bubble (last visited July 28, 2020) ("So, how does a
country of only 50 million people become the third-largest market in the world
for Bitcoin trades, behind Japan and the United States? ... Young investors in
Korea say that this is the only way they can emulate the rich, while others argue
that the virtual currency market will never be able redistribute the wealth.").
275. See, e.g., MYUNG HUN KANG, THE KOREAN BUSINESS CONGLOMERATE:
CHAEBOL THEN AND Now 198 (1996) ("Recently in Korea, the concentration of
wealth by chaebol groups has been introduced as an important social issue.
Special focus is given to the speculation in real estate by chaebol groups.
Excessive investment in real estate by an enterprise raises many issues on the
national economic side-for example, hampering sound management and
weakening the economy's international competitiveness.").
276. See Foreign Investment Promotion Act, Act No. 5559, Sept. 16, 1998,
amended by Act No. 16131, Dec. 31, 2018 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_
servicellawView.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG.
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enhance efficiencies in systemically undervalued firms. 277 Enormous
profit can be had by "simply" removing family control. Why hasn't
rational, systemic market intervention occurred?
The chaebol system is an enigma. A few plutocratic families with
little equity control a G-20 economy. 278 Like water through cracks,
abuse flows through obvious gaps in corporate law. The costs and
social consequences are high. Average Koreans object to wealth
inequity, stagnant economic opportunities, and hubris by families. 279
Why hasn't this strange system been reformed?
Corruption between business interests and government explains
much. 280
But it is only an incomplete answer, and the most
convenient one. If it was the sole cause, then we would conclude that
the chaebols will be dismantled once the highest levels of Korean
politics improve with respect to integrity and transparency. Perhaps,
but I believe likely not. The chaebol system has a legitimate rationale
and social utility under endogenous conditions. It has remained
durable not in spite of inefficiencies, but because of them in the sense
that inefficiency
and legitimate
interest are inextricably
intertwined. 281 The situation is complicated.
Korean corporate law can be understood as a lingua franca. It
restates the terminology of core American principles and thus
provides some assurance to foreign investors in a modern global
market. 282 At the same time, it maintains old traditions based on a
cozy and sometimes strained relationship between the two most
important stakeholders-dynastic families and the government. 2 83

277. See generally Rhee, supra note 100, at 551-56 (describing shareholder
activism by hedge funds and the market for corporate influence).
278. Kim & Ah-jeong, supra note 40 ("In Korea, chaebol families often
actually own only small fractions of the companies they control.").
279. See, e.g., Se-Woong Koo, Anger and Envy in the Chaebol Republic,
FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 9, 2015, 2:04 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/09/
anger-and-envy-in-the-chaebol-republic-korea-nut-rage-samsung/;
East Asia
Forum, The Growing Inequality in South Korea, ECON. WATCH (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.economywatch.com/features/The-Growing-Inequality-in-SouthKorea.04-15-15.html.
280. See, e.g., Sang-Hun & Zhong, supra note 105 ("Over the decades,
numerous chaebol executives have been paraded into courts on bribery and other
charges. But they have usually walked away with light sentences (most of them
suspended), free to manage their businesses, even as courts routinely sentenced
lesser-known white-collar criminals to far longer terms for lesser offenses.").
281. See, e.g., Simon Denyer, South Korea's President Once Decried Powerful
Tycoons, Now He Needs Them to Woo Pyongyang, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2018, 9:16
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreaspresident-once-decried-powerful-tycoons-now-he-needs-them-to-woopyongyang/2018/12/08/dfff8020-eefb-11e8-9236-bb94154151d2_story.html
("South Korea's megacompanies have become key partners in his outreach to
North Korea.").
282. Ko, supra note 1, at 9.
283. See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 284.
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The peculiar Korean system exists because these two stakeholders
4
share a common interest. 28
The private interest of controlling families requires little
comment. The aggrandizement of wealth and power is as old as
humankind. 285 The interest studied in this article is the Korean
government's legitimate interest in maintaining a chaebol system
despite a myriad of social and economic problems associated with a
chaebol system. This alignment of private and public interests
explains much.
A.

Public Benefit of Control

The paramount interest of government is to maintain power over
the economy. 286 Economic control is a part of the government's
constitutional obligation. 28 7 This interest is advanced when chaebol
288
Chaebol control
families retain control of major corporate groups.
participation
state
of
policy
Park
Hee
Chung
original
the
maintains
289
to coordinate
government
the
It
enables
development.
in economic
290
situation to
this
Compare
easily.
more
economy
the
and control
who
managers
professional
by
controlled
are
companies
one where
owe duties only to the corporation and all shareholders. In the United
States, the private nature of corporate law is doctrine; corporate law
is not generally considered imbued with a public purpose grounded in
national interests. 2 91 This doctrine is not embraced in Korea. The
2 92
and a large portion
state has a paramount interest in the economy,
of the economy is attributable to a few corporate groups. Family
293
control is a reassuring, long-term partner in a public enterprise.

284. See id.
285. See supra Part II.
286. Two public interests are paramount: national security and the economy.
These interests are related, and the chaebols are a link. See Denyer, supranote
281.
287. See supra notes 58, 239 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text
289. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
291. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 122(9) (2019); Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary
Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the
Hobson's Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 701-02
(2010) (showing that in a national crisis, corporate law empowers the corporation
to pursue the "public welfare" and to aid in "national emergency").
292. KOREAN CONSTITUTION, art. 119(2) (S. Kor.); see supra note 59 and
accompanying text. "The Korean system has included significant central
planning and guided capital markets, with regulatory and prosecutorial actions
as the primary sources of legal action with respect to disciplining managers of
large corporate wealth (as opposed to private litigation). The governance
environment resulting from the economic and political institutions of Korea are
unique to the nation." Pak, supra note 47, at 94.
293. See Puchniak & Kim, supra note 193, at 5.
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The government's interest in influencing corporate governance is
evinced by the criminal provisions in Korean corporate law. 294 There
is a spectrum of bad conduct. 295 At one end are substantively
negligent, unreasonable, or ill-advised actions. Korea and the United
States differ on how to treat such actions because risk preferences
and economic calculations are different. 296 At the other end are
obvious criminal actions involving the concepts of fraud, theft, public
harm, or intentional violations of law. 297 The middle is the grey area.
It encompasses actions that are in bad faith or opportunistic by
managers and controlling shareholders. Here, the two laws diverge.
Crimes under Korean corporate law include violations of duties
arising under corporate law. 298 The United States has no comparable
provisions because the internal affairs of the corporation, without
more, 299 are deemed to be in the private realm.
This divergence is best understood in the context of Korean
political and economic organization. Monitoring by investors has
historically been feeble.3 00 Bank scrutiny was lax and shareholder
derivative suits were few.3 0 1 Since chaebols enjoyed government
financing, criminalization of corporate law imposes public oversight
in the absence of private monitoring.3 0 2 Criminalization gives the
government a lever of control in internal affairs in some
circumstances, which is consistent with the Korean constitutional
scheme. 303 It evinces a public purpose of corporations, the pursuit of
national interests through private enterprise.3 0 4
Monitoring aside, the government uses a broader spectrum of
criminal law, such as tax and anticorruption laws, to regulate chaebol
families. 305 While such actions are not apparently related to
corporate governance (from the perspective of how American
corporate law and governance generally work), criminal prosecutions
have been an oft-used tool in the government's toolbox to discipline
294. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
296. See supra Subpart III.A.
297. Supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
298. Supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
299. E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1350 (2018).
300. Ko, supra note 1, at 15.
301. Id.
302. See infra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 292.
304. Pak, supra note 47, at 93. See BREEN, supra note 58, at 218 ("Unlike, say,
American companies, which run on a model of increasing shareholder wealth,
Korean firms existed initially for nation-building."); infra Subpart III.C.
305. E.g., Choe Sang-Hun, Family Behind Korean Conglomerate Lotte Is
Indicted in
Corruption
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/business/international/south-korea-lottechaebol-conglomerate-indicted.html; Choe Sang-Hun, Samsung's Chairman Is
Indicted for Tax Evasion in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/business/worldbusiness/17ihtsamsung.4.12107507.html.
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wayward families. 306 A prime example of this disciplinary device is
the recent scandals surrounding the family of Korean Air Lines, a
company in the Hanjin chaebol. 307 Their troubles are truly tawdry
The most infamous episode is known as the "nut rage
tales.
incident."30 8 The chairman's older daughter, an executive in the
airline, ordered a Korean Air plane, which was taxiing on the runway
at a New York airport in route on an international flight, to return to
the terminal gate to expel a flight attendant for breaching service
protocol by failing to remove the macadamia nuts from the plastic
309
She was
package before serving her in the first class section.
subsequently convicted in Korean court for illegally forcing a flight
change under Korean aviation law, but her conviction was overturned
3 10
Recently, other members of
on appeal on suspect legal reasoning.
306. E.g., supranote 305; infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
307. Unlike other chaebol companies, the family owns a substantial stake in
Korean Air. See Emily Price, Korean Air CEO Ousted from Board after Family
Scandals, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:56 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/03/27

/korean- air-ceo-ousted-from-board-after-family- scandals/ (reporting that

the

family owns about 32% of shares).
308. The incident has its own Wikipedia page. Nut Rage Incident, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nutrage_incident (last visited July 28, 2020).
309. The following description provides a sense of the behavior: "[According to
the head steward, the chairman's] daughter had forced him to kneel and
apologize on the plane as punishment for the way one of his stewards had served
the nuts to passengers in first class. The head steward was kicked off the aircraft
when it returned to the gate. 'You can't imagine the humiliation I felt unless you
experienced it yourself,' the steward, Park Chang-jin, said, adding that Ms. Cho
called him names, hit him several times with a folder of documents and hurled it
at the junior steward." Choe Sang-Hun, KoreanAir Chairman Strips Daughter's
Titles After Her 'Foolish' Behavior, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/world/asia/korean-airs-chairman-removesdaughter-from-executive-posts-after-nut-incident.html.
310. Joyce Lee, South Korean 'Nut Rage' Executive Remains FreeAfter Court
Upholds Suspended Sentence, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2017, 2:01 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-nuts-verdict/south-korean-nut-

rage-executive-remains-free-after-court-upholds-suspended-sentenceThis case illustrates a common pattern of government
idUSKBN1EFOL5.
prosecutions followed by judicial intervention in favor of chaebol families,
resulting in light sanctions. See supra note 149 and infra notes 319-20. The
legal grounds for such favorable interventions are sometimes questionable. See
supra note 149. This case is illustrative. The statute in the case provides: "Any
person who has impeded a normal flight of any aircraft by causing the deviation
of its air route in flight through deceptive or forcible means shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than ten years." Aviation

Security Act, Act. No. 14939, Oct. 24, 2017, art. 42 (emphasis added), translated
database,
Institute
online
Research
Legislation
in
Korea
"In
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/engservice/lawView.do?hseq=45882&lang=ENG.
flight" is a statutory term of art. The statute defines: "The term 'in flight' means
the status maintained by an aircraft from the point when its doors are all closed
following boarding by passengers until the doors are opened to allow the
passengers to disembark." Id. art. 2(1) (emphasis added). The definition seems
plain and unambiguous even to non-Korean lawyers. Yet, the Korean Supreme
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the Hanjin chaebol family have been alleged to have engaged in bad
behavior, sparking various government inquiries.3 1 1 This spate of
scandals and investigations spurred shareholders to deny a board
seat to the father, a rare moment of successful activism even though
the family controlled about 32 percent of votes. 312
The Hanjin chaebol is a large corporate group.31 3 Korean Air is a
major public corporation and the flagship national carrier. 314 In April
2019, the father died, and his son assumed the corporate
leadership. 31 5 The market reaction to the death of the patriarch was
a discernible, abnormal increase in stock price. 316 Family control and
Court's contorted decision was based on the contrived reasoning that, despite the
plain meaning in the statutory definition, "in flight" encompasses only a flying
plane as opposed to a taxiing plane. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Do8335,
Dec. 21, 2017 (S. Kor.) (en banc).
311. See Cho Chung-un, Korean Air Chief Apologizes, Fires Daughters Over
'Water
Rage',
KOREA
HERALD
(Apr.
22,
2018,
7:11
PM),
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180422000237 ("Triggered by [the
chairman's] youngest child reportedly throwing water at an agency official during
a meeting, the 'water rage' spread fast inside and outside the country, raising
questions as to unqualified chaebol scions in executive posts."); Sohn Ji-young,
Korean Air Heiress Returns Home to Barrage of Criticisms, Probe for Violence,
KOREA HERALD (Apr. 15, 2018, 6:10 PM), http://www.koreaherald.com/
view.php?ud=20180415000193 ("[T]he case had highlighted the privileges and
abuse of power by scions of Korea's family-run conglomerates that dominate the
economy."); Kyunghee Park, Korean Air's Chairman Faces Trial After
Embezzlement
Probe,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
15,
2018,
2:53
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/korean-air-s-chairmancho-faces-trial-after-embezzlement-probe ("Korean Air Lines Co. Chairman Cho
Yang-ho is set to stand trial in an embezzlement case, adding to troubles faced
by a family that's been at the center of rage-driven scandals."); Kim Tong-Hyung,
Widow, Daughterof Korean Air ChairmanAppear on Trial, WASH. T1MEs (May 2,
2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/ 2/widow-daughter-ofkorean-air-chairman-appear-on-tr/ ("The widow and daughter of Korean Air
Chairman appeared in a South Korean court on Thursday over charges they
unlawfully hired housekeepers from the Philippines.").
312. Price, supra note 307.
313. Stephen Evans, Hanjin Bankruptcy: Are South Korea's 'Chaebols' In
Crisis?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/business37295185.
314. Korean Air to Introduce Boeing 787-10 for First Time in Korea, KOREAN
AIR (June 19, 2019), https://www.koreanair.com/global/en/about/news/press_
release/2019_06_B787-10/.
315. Korean Air Parent Appoints Heir Apparent Cho Won-tae as New
Chairman, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2019, 6:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
hanjin-kal-chairman/update- 1-korean-air-parent-appoints-heir-apparent-chowon-tae-as-new-chairman-idUSL3N2262H5. The son is not without controversy.
See Kwak Jung-soo, Korean Air Princess Is Just the Tip of the Abusive Chaebol
Iceberg, HANKYOREH (Dec. 11, 2014, 13:20 KST), http://english.hani.co.kr/
arti/english-edition/e_editorial/668599.html (noting allegations of "pushing over
a woman in her seventies over a road dispute, or a 2012 episode when he verbally
abused a civic group protesting over the management of Inha University").
316. Andrew Frew McMillan, Korean Air Parent Hanjin's Stock Rockets on
Death of Chaebol Leader, REAL MONEY (Apr. 8, 2019, 1:00 PM),
https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/korean-air-parent-hanjins-

2020]

CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE

691

filial corporate governance raise a serious public policy question:
What does hereditary (and patrilineal) passage of control to the
descendants of chaebol families mean for the nation?
The scandals of the Hanjin chaebol family and the bad behavior
of other chaebol families are seemingly unconnected to corporate
governance. But American norms and practices show that supposedly
private bad acts can be properly seen as important matters of
corporate governance because moral, ethical leadership is critically
important. 317 In the case of Korea, bad behavior is more than just
3 18
The rule of law in
fodder for tabloid tales and social reprobation.
Korea applies leniently to chaebol families and executives on account
3 19
There is a
of their perceived contribution to the national economy.
historical pattern of government sanctions or criminal inquiries
320
This
followed by light judicial penalties or presidential pardons.
pattern highlights a serious aspect of Korean corporate governance.
Criminal and regulatory actions for bad behavior are a form of public
monitoring and disciplining whenever families stray too far from
either public expectations or minimal standards of corporate
32 1
Both
governance and ethical leadership of important enterprises.
the government and the chaebols are susceptible to public (populist)
reprobation because they are linked in history and are still in

&

3
("Korean Air Lines shares closed
stock-rockets-death-chaebol-leader-1491991
as
much as 8.2% during the day. The
risen
having
Seoul,
in
up 1.9% on Monday
shares of holding entity Hanjin Kal soared 20.6%.").
317. E.g., Don Clark, Intel C.E.O. Brian Krzanich Resigns After Relationship
2
with Employee, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/ 1/
David A. Katz
technology/intel-ceo-resigns-consensual-relationship.html;
Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: ShareholderActivism Is the
Next Phase of #MeToo, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-updateYaffe-Bellany,
David
shareholder-activism-is-the-next-phase-of-metoo/;
McDonald's C.E.O. FiredOver a Relationship That's Becoming Taboo, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/business/mcdonalds-ceofired.html.
318. See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 333-35.
319. See id. (noting that prosecutors, courts, and the president show
systematic leniency when chaebol families and executives engaged in criminal
conduct in light of "their roles in developing the economy" and "exaggerated
concerns that punishing corporate defendants, especially from larger chaebols,
would damage the reputation of the company and in turn cause serious economic
damage to the country").
320. Sherisse Pham, South Korea's Long History of Light Sentences for
Business Leaders, CNN Bus. (Jan. 17, 2017, 6:23 AM), https://money.cnn.com
See
/2017/01/17/investing/south-korea-chaebol-culture-corruption/index.html.
Sang-Hun et al., supranote 103 (noting that prior heads of the Samsung chaebol
repeatedly escaped prosecution for bribery and tax evasion with suspended or
light penalties); sources cited supra note 149 (noting that courts cite adverse
effects on the national economy as justification for leniency).
321. See Sang-Hun et al., supra note 103.
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symbiosis today. 322 The history of Korean politics shows that Koreans
are capable of mass populist movements, political activism, and
rebellions. 323 The recent impeachment and removal of Geun Hye
Park is just the latest demonstration of modern Korean politics. The
state and the chaebols are well aware of the volatile possibility of
popular sentiments. 324

322. See Kim & Park, supra note 68, at 267 ("[D]uring the Park era, the statechaebol relationship was characterized by a constant effort to balance between
the predatory and the developmental tendencies of the state, the cronyism and
the entrepreneurial energy of the chaebol, and the generation of rents and the
regulation of the ensuing moral hazards."); Ko, supra note 1, at 9-10 ("It may be
true that chaebols are a big source of the problem . ... One might, however, be
justified in arguing that chaebols themselves are a product of the Korean
development model and they evolved responding to the signals they received from
the government and the whole economy."); RHO, supra note 109, at 56 (noting
that government policy viewed chaebols as serving three roles: (1) "as an
instrument of a social goal, that is, of national prosperity"; (2) "chaebol had an
obligation as a beneficiary of national support"; (3) "especially because their
growth owed much to state intervention, the chaebol were expected not to
exercise their economic power against the interest of social justice").
323. See CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 342-403. The transition from military
dictatorship to civilian government was preceded by a mass and violent prodemocracy movement from the 1960s to 1980s. See id. at 343 (describing the
Kwangju Rebellion in May 1980, which resulted in the killings of hundreds of
protestors by the military, as "Korea's Tiananmen nightmare"). The most recent
example of populist uprising is the 2017 successful impeachment of the Geun Hye
Park, the daughter of the dictator Chung Hee Park who created the chaebol
system. Indeed, in the impeachment of Park, Korea showed the world how the
populace in a developed democracy can exercise a more direct form of democracy
through compelling, peaceful popular expression. This impeachment was not
instigated or implemented by the workings of political institutions; instead, the
popular will forced the political institutions, including the courts, to remove a
corrupt,
incompetent
president.
Cf.
Tom
Ginsburg,
Confucian
Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and
Taiwan, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 763, 787 (2002); Sungmoon Kim, From
Remonstrance to Impeachment: A Curious Case of "Confucian Constitutionalism"
in South Korea, 44 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 586, 589 (2019). The impeachment
followed months of peaceful protests in which millions of Koreans demonstrated
during the coldest months of winter. Frank Ahrens, South Koreans Are Showing
the World How Protests Can Work, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/08/south-koreans-

are-showing-the-world-how-protests-can-work/ (noting that Koreans protested
for six straight weeks in downtown Seoul with as many as 1.7 million protesters);
Ju-min Park & Jack Kim, South Korea Park Approval Rating Slightly Up to 5
Percent:Gallup Korea, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016, 8:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-southkorea-politics-poll-idUSKBN13Y04L;
Choe Sang-Hun, South
Koreans Rally in Largest Protest in Decades to Demand President'sOuster, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11 /13/world/asia/koreapark-geun-hye-protests.html ("[H]undreds of thousands of South Koreans filled
central Seoul on Saturday to demand the resignation of President Park Geunhye.. . ."); Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Removes PresidentPark Geun-hye, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/parkgeun-hye-impeached- south-korea.html.
324. See Ahrens, supra note 323.
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If the chaebols and their families are so troublesome to
policymakers, so irrational to scholars, and so unpopular among
average Koreans, 325 why not break them up with real reform? It is
not too difficult to envision the core principle toward effective reform:
a prohibition against the use of cross-shareholding for control or
entrenchment purpose and effective enforcement of that rule of
law.32 6 Policymakers have been conflicted over the pros and cons of
the chaebol system. For all their faults, chaebols have played a major
role in the Korean economic miracle. 327 One hastens to add, however,
that their accomplishments were possible only because the state
picked winners and losers with public assets in the initial condition
of rapid economic transformation. 328 This fact is the source of popular
disapproval and resentment. 329 On the other hand, as the drivers of
3 30
This
the national economy, the chaebols have a public purpose.
331
consideration prevails in the Korean system.
The critical public benefit is that the chaebol system is a form of
national control.33 2 From the private side of the families, the chaebol
system maintains control over businesses they no longer own. From
the public side of policymakers, it is another form of mercantilism. It
is the key takeover defense against foreign acquisition of national
economic assets.3 33 Such protectionist control is grounded in facts
334
Among
and not legal devices, which is a critical distinction.
economically advanced nations that partake in open markets and free
trade, rules that discriminate against foreign investors would be
suspect and counterproductive to attracting capital. A distinction
325. See BREEN, supranote 58, at 223, 233 ("The chaebol have always been a
visible and convenient target for the broader complaints of Koreans about the
corruption, unfairness, and powerlessness they experience. . . . No one loves
them."); Alastair Gale, Nut Rage' Reignites Backlash Against South Korea's
Family-Run Conglomerates, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2015, 1:22 PM),
https://www.wsj .com/articles/nut-rage-reignites-backlash-against-south-koreasfamily-run-conglomerates-1420654954 (discussing public disapproval of chaebols
and their families); Sang-Hun & Zhong, supra note 105 (noting that the third
generation of heirs of chaebols are viewed "with skepticism, if not downright
scorn" and are "accused of inheriting management control and wealth" through
questionable corporate governance practices).
326. See supra note 99 (describing the American rule on cross-shareholding).
327, See Joongi Kim, supra note 17, at 277.
328. See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
329. BREEN, supra note 58, at 238 ("Koreans do not believe the rich have
Rather, given the extent of
earned their wealth fairly and legitimately.
government control and corruption, it is as if they have been allowed to get rich
because it was useful for the country for them to do their thing, while your
average Mr. Kim wasn't.").
330. See CUMINGS, supra note 49, at 317.
331. See supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
332. See Pak, supranote 47, at 100-01.
333. See BREEN, supra note 58, at 223.
334. See Pak, supranote 47, at 100-01.

694

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

between rule-based and fact-based prohibitions is important. Facts
are simply the circumstances in which an investment is made. Even
when markets are open to foreign investment and investors expect
legal protections consistent with an advanced market, chaebol control
keeps domestic companies in national control. 33 5
Families have principal control, but control is really a duopoly.
Korean law does not permit perpetual, property-based control, such
as dual class stock. The nature of complex cross-shareholding shows
that family control can be quite tenuous due to continual equity
dilution. The government is a key arbiter.
Family control is
augmented by the government per the National Pension Service, a
public pension plan and the largest single shareholder in Korea. 336
This set of private and public voting blocks must be seen as a
significant benefit among a consensus of Korean elites and, implicitly,
even the general populace in a country that has a strong national
identity and a collective sense of shared interest in the national
economy. 337 Foreign acquisitions without broad consensus on the
benefit to Korean interests would conflict with perceived national
interests. 338 The most important benefit of the chaebol system is
ultimately rooted in the collective stake in the economy and strong
nationalism that is a fundamental trait of the Korean nation and
people. 339 In the United States, excepting key industry sectors with
335. See id. (recounting the attempted foreign takeover of SK Corp. and
attributing nationalistic sentiments to the defeat).
336. See KIM, supra note 109, at 308 & figure 11.1 (noting that the NPS is the
third largest pension fund in the world and the largest shareholder in some of the
biggest Korean corporations); Geoffrey Cain, Korean Pension Fund Backs
Corporate Royals Again, As1A TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019), https://asiatimes.com
/2019/03/korean-pension-fund-backs-corporate-royals-again/
(noting that the
NPS holds 5 to 10 percent of chaebol companies).
337. See BREEN, supra note 58, at 233.
338. See id. ("While making money out of foreigners-i.e., exporting-was
considered virtuous, there was a collective revulsion at the notion that foreigners
should be making profits in Korea.").
339. One cannot understand Korean society without appreciating Korean
nationalism. See id. at 88-97 ("One of the best-known things about the Koreans
is that they are nationalistic."); FuKUYAMA, supra note 69, at 141 ("[N]ationalism
and national identity are much more highly developed in Korea than they are in
China, for all of the similarities between the two cultures."); Wonsik Hong,
Korean's Formation of RelationshipsBased on Uri ("We") and its Philosophical
Background, in KOREAN Soc'Y 34 (noting a connection between Korean
nationalism and Confucianism). "Nationalism" is a loaded term in light of the
tragic history of the twentieth century and more recently the election of Donald
Trump and his "America first" shibboleth. Korean nationalism is not the
aggressive ideology of the awful kind that has led to historical tragedies. It is not
based on demagoguery, racism, imperialism, or collective insanity. Korea is the
only country in the East Asia region that has no history of attacking its neighbors.
Instead, tragedies have historically been inflicted on the Koreans. Always being
in a position of weakness, it was historically known as the Hermit Kingdom, a
moniker expressing a collective desire to be left alone. Korean nationalism arose
as a response to repeated historical tragedies; the sentiment is defensive, insular,
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direct national security implications, corporate law and governance
are not generally seen through the prism of nationalism. If Sony, a
Japanese company, bought Apple (assuming no issues related to
national security or violation of competition law), the deal would
likely be cheered for delivering value to the collective shareholders.
But the perspective of corporate law as existing in the realm of private
law cannot be assumed in the Korean case. If Sony bought Samsung,
the deal would most certainly be traumatic to Korean society and
economy. Nationalism is an important facet of Korean corporate law
and governance.
The importance of control is seen in the failed hostile takeover of
the SK Corporation, the key corporation in the SK chaebol. Milhaupt
340
Before the takeover
and Pistor recount the following basic facts.
attempt, the SK group endured several years of scandals involving
self-dealing transactions and accounting fraud by the chairman,
resulting in depressed stock prices for most companies in the group,
In 2003, a foreign investor (Sovereign Asset
including SK.341
342
Its purpose was
Management) acquired 14.9 percent of SK's stock.
to acquire control, remove family members from management, and
343
In response, the company
operate SK as an independent company.
devised a white knight, antitakeover strategy. It sought to sell shares
constituting 10.4 percent of voting power to a friendly bank, which
344
Sovereign sued
would pledge support of incumbent management.
to enjoin the issuance, arguing that the tactic "would be a blatant
345
breach of globally accepted standards of corporate governance."
The trial court (Seoul District Court) ruled that "faced with
Sovereign's possible takeover, the decision by SK's board, which was
346
Sovereign
made to defend its management control, is legitimate."

&

and based on a strong sense of community bound by a common history, ethnicity,
and adversity. A strong nationalistic sentiment preserved the Korean nation
through repeated history of conquest and colonization, a vulnerability rooted in
its strategic geography between China and Japan. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 69,
at 141; K-BAIK LEE, A NEW HISTORY OF KOREA 300-72 (Edward W. Wagner
Edward J. Shultz trans., 1984). This communitarian, collectivist form of
nationalism is seen in the habitual linguistic use of the word uri (-21) (meaning
"we" or "us" or "our"), which conveys a deep cultural meaning of "our nation," "our
people," "our community" in daily language. See Hong, supra, at 31-48.
340. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 101, at 109-13 (providing the facts in
this paragraph). See Hwa-Jin Kim, The Market for Corporate Control in Korea,
in KOREAN BUsINEsS LAw, supra note 5, at 244-48; Jeong Seo, Who Will Control
Frankenstein?The Korean Chaebol's CorporateGovernance, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 21, 54-57, 69 (2006) (describing the SK chaebol and Sovereign's failed
takeover).
341. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 101, at 110-11.
342. Id. at 111.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 112.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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then waged a proxy contest to obtain the votes of other foreign
shareholders who held 42.3 percent of shares (diluted down from 46.9
percent due to the new share issuance). 34 7 Sovereign lost. Thirtyfour of thirty-six domestic institutional shareholders sided with
management, and control remained with the family. 348 Sovereign
then sought to call an extraordinary meeting to seek a vote on the
removal of the family patriarch. It had a legal right to call this
meeting, but the board refused. 349 Sovereign sued again, and the
court again sided with the company.
While acknowledging
Sovereign's legal right to call a meeting, the court ruled that
"continuous instability with respect to the management right might
bring about the departure of investors and cause the investment
value to decline" and noted the importance of "management stability
at least until the annual general shareholders meeting next year."3 50
On appeal, the Seoul High Court affirmed the trial court's decision
and characterized Sovereign's exercise of a legal right as an "abuse of
right." 351 It also upheld the chairman's criminal conviction, but
suspended the sentence, permitting him to resume his chairmanship
and control of the company. Sovereign divested its stake in SK and
called the entire affair "a national tragedy." 35 2
The SK saga illustrates the role of the government and national
interest in maintaining chaebol control. Most domestic institutional
investors sided with management, notwithstanding the impact on
firm value, return on investment, and the abusive acts of the
controlling family.
The court ruled in favor of management,
notwithstanding a major shareholder's legal rights, related to the
shareholder franchise under Korean corporate law. Newspapers
played on nationalistic sentiments and warned that chaebols were
engines of economic growth and that they were being "attacked" by
foreign investors.35 3
To understand the SK episode, one must understand the real
conflict. The interests in conflict were not between shareholders and
management in the paradigm of agency cost and shareholder
primacy, an American-centric perspective.
Instead, they were
between good corporate governance and control of national economic

347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 113.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 121. See Pak, supra note 47, at 100 (commenting that foreign
investors' call for greater shareholder rights "has been interpreted in many cases
as a foreign challenge to Korean cultural values" and "has predictably triggered
a fortress mentality among the ranks of management, labor, and community
activists at companies perceived as coming under attack by shareholder rights
advocates from abroad").
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assets. In the SK saga, this choice was binary. National interest
prevailed. 354
The chaebols have been and are a form of a public-private
bargain. 355 The government and the chaebols have a long history
356
together. The relationship has been symbiotic, if not simpatico.
This simple fact explains how a convicted criminal can be released
from jail and thereupon resume control of an important public
company. 357 The economy is organized in the model of state-corporate
capitalism where the government is a regulator, a monitor, and a
partner. The government could break up the chaebols through
sweeping reform, 358 but does not. The main reason is the risk of the
unknown: What happens if the chaebols are broken up? What
happens when key companies are independent and ultimate control
lies in the markets?
From the perspective of Korean policymakers, the answer cannot
be to let control float in the global capital markets. Like all advanced
economies, the economy and its corporations are inextricably linked.

354. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 101, at 118-20.
355. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 322. Even the concept of an independent director has
been molded into a public-private framework by the chaebols, which was not the
government's original design. In Korea, as well as other parts of Asia, the policy
goal of independent directors is to monitor controlling shareholders in familydominated enterprises. Puchniak & Kim, supra note 193, at 111. However,
independent directors have been used as a revolving-door link between the
government and the company. Id. at 116 (explaining that Korean companies
employ ex-government officials as independent directors to serve a lobbying
function because Korean law prohibits companies from retaining professional
lobbyists). Unlike the United States, where independent directors are generally
selected for their business experience, Korean directors are professors (28.5
percent), lawyers including former judges and prosecutors (17.9 percent), former
government officials (15.9 percent), businesspersons (13.3 percent), and
accountants (5.7 percent). Chun, supra note 54, at 203. Why so many professors?
"From the perspective of the controlling shareholders and their family members,
professors would be far less dangerous to their interests than the senior

executives of other companies, because they have fewer conflicts of interest and
less knowledge about the actual business or industry." Id. at 206.
357. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 101, at 113 (noting that the chairman
of SK resumed control upon conviction and suspended sentence); Denyer, supra
note 281 (noting lenient outcomes for the leaders of several chaebols). In the
United States, government authorities have broad authority to bar persons

unsuitable for service as an officer or director of a public company. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 248(f), 1818(e) (2018); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(2), 77t(e) (2018). See generally
Barnard, supra note 108 (discussing the SEC's power to suspend and bar service
of officers and directors to public companies); Jones, supranote 108 (arguing that
the SEC barring senior executives and outside directors would do more to deter
fraud than corporate penalties and the unlikely chance of criminal prosecution).
358. Such reform would not be complicated in concept. It could broadly
prohibit the use of cross-shareholding for entrenchment purpose. See supranote
99.
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They are connected to national interest. 359 Control of large corporate
groups held in a few families with a history of symbiotic relations
facilitates public control of the economy and society. 360 A complex
market of innumerable private actors, each acting under private
incentives with no obligation owed to public interests-i.e., the
American model-would be a difficult leap in a system of statecorporate capitalism with Korean characteristics. Because many
companies in chaebol groups have been subsidized or propped up, an
uncontrolled
severing
of cross-affiliations
may
result
in
vulnerabilities to financial distress and hostile takeover, and related
economic and social disruptions from acquisitions, disposals, change
in control, and changes in entity domestication. Such events would
concern, to say the least, policy elites and average Koreans alike.
Unless and until there is a clear, palatable alternative to chaebols,
family control achieves important public outcomes. Dramatic reform
of chaebol ownership structure is unlikely because Korean
policymakers deem unacceptable the alternative of passing control to
the aggregate of unaffiliated shareholders in the global capital
markets. In Korean eyes, legitimate policy considerations are quite
complex.361

B.

Culture and Corporate Governance

Culture is a significant factor in explaining any country's
corporate law. This is not a generally applied concept in the American

359. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 69, at 141 ("[E]conomic success was pursued
for reasons of national pride; nationalism was one motive, independent of
economic rationale, for wanting large-scale industries in leading economic
sectors.").
360. Dwight Eisenhower's comment about pro-American dictators is apt here:
"They're OK if they're our s.o.b.'s." ALFRED W. McCOY, IN THE SHADOWS OF THE
AMERICAN CENTURY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF US GLOBAL POWER

62 (2017)

(emphasis in original).
361. The current Jae In Moon administration is a liberal, reform-minded
administration that, thus far, seems to be largely free of the corruption that has
tainted past presidents. Prior to the presidency, Moon was a human rights
attorney. The following account of a key bureaucrat in the Moon administration
hints at the complex dynamics of the government's policy calculus.
The man who personified the hopes for reform is Kim Sang-jo, an antichaebol activist brought in to head the regulatory Korea Fair Trade
Commission. Kim was nicknamed the "chaebol sniper" and was
violently dragged out of a Samsung shareholders' meeting in 2004 after
asking about bribes paid to politicians. In government, Kim is less
outspoken. He now says the chaebols are "the core of our nation's
competitive power." Rather than break them up, he wants to create
incentives for voluntary "behavioral change" by amending competition
law and launching investigations into cases where chaebols are
suspected of breaking existing laws.
Denyer, supra note 281. See Bryan Harris & Song Jung-a, South Korea Chaebol
Reform Efforts Fail to Impress, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/7ec84434-4124-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b.
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literature on corporate law, which is heavily influenced by the
academic discipline of economics. But a comparative analysis here
requires an examination of culture since laws are a product of the
entire social-political-historical-economic milieu. Since some readers
may not have substantial knowledge of Korean culture to
contextualize the link, two noncorporate examples are given to
illustrate the importance of culture in particular situations in specific
social enterprises. The first is about playing soccer, and the other
about flying airplanes. These examples are stark and illustrate an
important lesson in Korean corporate culture.
Prior to the 2002 World Cup, the Korean men's soccer team had
36 2
In that year, the country
never won a World Cup game.
unexpectedly finished in the top four of the tournament among thirtytwo countries, the first Asian team to make the semifinals of the
363
The team beat
world's most prestigious sports competition.
traditional European powerhouses Spain, Italy, and Portugal along
the way. The success was attributable to the Dutch coach Guus
Hiddink. 364 Upon taking the reins, he was surprised by the role of
36 5
Players were selected on
cultural hierarchy and social connections.
the basis of non-meritorious factors such as social connections and
seniority, and field play saw younger players passing the ball to older
3 66
Hiddink disabused the team
players out of hierarchical obligation.
36 7
Due to the
of that culture and instituted a merit-based system.
legacy of the 2002 World Cup unexpected success and the
breakthrough cultural change, Korea today consistently fields highly
competitive teams in international competitions and produces young
players who play in top European leagues.
Another example of the influence of culture in social enterprise is
36 8
A
Korean Air's history of deadly accidents in the 1980s and 1990s.
major cause of the terrible safety record was the cockpit culture,
Subordinate crew were
which mirrored larger social dynamics.
WIKIPEDIA,
Team,
Football
National
Korea
362. South
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SouthKorea_national_football_team (last updated
Apr. 8, 2020).
363. Id.
364. Chris Bakker, Eternal Korean Hero Guus Hiddink, HANZE MAG (Apr. 10,
2017), https://hanzemag.com/eternal-korean-hero-guus-hiddink/.
365. Id.
366.

See SIMON KUPER & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, SOCcERNoMICS 398 (2012) ("The

Korean disease, as Hiddink soon discovered, was hierarchy. In Korean soccer,
the older the player, the higher his status.").
367. PAUL D. SWEENEY & DEAN B. MCFARLIN, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIc OPPORTUNITIES AND CULTURAL CHALLENGES 438 (5th ed. 2015). Among

other things, Hiddink cut some of the older players from the squad and made a
young player the captain. Id. at 399.
WIKIPEDIA,
Accidents,
and
Air
Incidents
Korean
368. See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KoreanAir_incidentsand_accidents (listing many
accidents in 1980s and 1990s) (last updated Sept. 30, 2019).
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hesitant to question the captain's judgment, and this culture
contributed to some of these accidents. 369 Multiple hierarchies were
at work in the cockpit. Hierarchy in corporate culture is universal.
Korean culture is strongly influenced by the Confucian philosophy of
social relationships and hierarchy. 370 Korea has mandatory military
service, and virtually all civilian pilots would have had military
experience, many in military aviation. Only when Korean Air fixed
the cockpit culture did it become one of the safest airlines in the
world. 371 Cultural changes included instituting English as the formal
language in the cockpit 72 and Western-style crew resource
management protocols. 3 73
These two examples show that certain cultural norms in the
context of specific social enterprises may have pros and cons. Two
poorly run social enterprises became global successes only when
cultural norms ill-suited to the specific enterprise (scoring goals and
flying safely) were replaced with better ones. This lesson is applicable
to corporate governance. Culture is a core problem and presents the
limits of corporate governance reform in Korea. Corporate control
and governance cannot be explained purely in terms of property
rights. Culture explains two major deficits in Korean law and
369. See SCHUMAN, supra note 195, at 186 ("Both Asian and non-Asian
experts deemed the hierarchy within the cockpits of Korean airliners a factor
behind their weak safety records."); Jonathan DeHart, Asiana Airlines Crash:A
Cockpit Culture Problem?, DIPLOMAT (July 16, 2013), https://thediplomat.coml
2013/07/asiana-airlines-crash-a-cockpit-culture-problem/;
Don Phillips,
Is
Culture a Factor in Air Crashes? Guam Probe May Raise Touchy Issue, WASH.
POST (Mar.
18, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1998/03/18/is-culture-a-factor-in-air-crashes-guam-probe-may-raise-touchyissue/7aca0396-a176-42ca-a4b0-4f6d8568115f/.
370. See HARRISON, supra note 195, at 82-83.
371. Abby Ohlheiser, Malcolm Gladwell's Cockpit Culture Theory and the
Asiana Crash, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2013/07/malcolm-gladwells-cockpit-culture-theory-everywhereafter-asiana-crash/313442/.
372. The use of English was an important reform for two reasons. It is the
language of the aviation world. Just as important is the culture embedded in
language. See BREEN, supra note 58 (describing the cultural significance of the
word uri ("we" or "us")); Kim Park Nelson, Uri Nara, Our Country: Korean
American Adoptees in the Global Age, in DIASPORIC RETURNS TO THE ETHNIC
HOMELAND: THE KOREAN DIAsPORA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 144 (Takeyuki

Tsuda & Changzoo Song eds., 2019). Korean language has many levels of
formalities that indicate social situations and relative position among speakers.
Different forms of speech and vocabulary are used in conversations among, for
example, friends, persons of different age, relatives, and businesspersons.
Speaking in improper levels would be odd or rude. When the deferential form of
language is used, as would be the case between superior and subordinate officers,
the language conveys a hierarchy and social norms require subordination based
on relative social positions.
373. See Bruce Stanley, Korean Air Bucks Tradition to Fix Problems, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11367687508
5241209 (describing changes in cockpit culture and protocols brought about by
foreign experts).
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governance: the distrust of private enforcement, and the lack of
managerial independence.
Korean corporate law exhibits a clear distrust of private
It emasculates the device for public
shareholder enforcement.
374
Only large
companies through the 1/10,000 ownership rule.
institutional shareholders can qualify. But institutional shareholders
are not good monitors. Judging by the behavior of domestic investors
in the SK saga and the culture of patronage in a market dominated
by oligarchic enterprises, few domestic shareholders would serve as
plaintiffs. Foreign activist shareholders face legal, political, and
societal hurdles. In large matters such as the SK episode, Korean
courts cannot be relied upon to separate economic and business issues
from national interests. 375 Judges are not insulated from the
influence of other branches of government, the press, and possibly
populist backlash. Given the general unpopularity of chaebols among
average Koreans, retail shareholders are a pool of motivated plaintiffs
if the right economic incentives are present, i.e., feasible attorney fees
and costs 37 6 and an impartial judiciary on these matters. This policy
choice behind the restrictive standing rule obviously expresses a dim
view of the American model of private attorney general. Why?
A culture of enforcement through private litigation is distinctly
American. 377 Korea does not have a long history of reliance on
litigation. Also, the concept of the corporation as a separate and
distinct entity subject to harm by persons therein is a relatively
foreign concept in Korea. The modern legal structure of corporate law
is linked to industrialization. In this regard, Korean industrialization
dates back only to the 1960s, and companies then were closely-held,
family businesses. 378 The concept of the public company is relatively
new. Among some Koreans, these companies are not considered
owned by the public, but by the families of founders, or at least their
rule should continue irrespective of the niceties of the legal structure
379
The older
of ownership and the formalities of corporate law.
generation still harbors some sense of goodwill toward the original
founders for their substantial contribution to nation-building and the
rise of modern Korea. 380 Another social factor is that Korean society

374. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 542(6), (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.).
375. See MILHAuPT & PISTOR, supra note 101, at 112.
376. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 405(1), (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.).
377. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND
FUTURE 1 (2015).

378. Aldag, supra note 124.
379. See BREEN, supra note 58, at 218 ("Owners started floating their
companies, but still conceived of them as their own. People who bought shares
were seen as gamblers without any rights, rather than co-owners.").
380. Id.
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has deep roots in the Confucian notion of social order and
hierarchy. 381
These cultural factors subjugate the role of
shareholders even when the aggregate of unaffiliated shareholders
are the true equity owners. Nationalistic sentiments can be a factor
if a foreign investor is involved. Legal means exist to challenge
foreign acquisitions that do not have at least tacit approval. 382 In
sum, Korean law and culture relegate most shareholders to virtually
no role in governance: domestic institutional shareholders are passive
and pliant; 383 foreign are unappreciated when they seek influence
without consent from important constituents; retail shareholders are
shut out completely.
Culture also explains the lack of independence. The concept of
the firm as an independent legal person is strongly rooted in
American law. 384
But the abstraction of owing duties to the
corporation itself has not taken deep root in Korean corporate
governance. In practice, managers believe they owe loyalty to the
chaebol families. Several cultural factors preempt the abstract rule
of legal personhood.

381. While the Confucian concept of hierarchy works detrimental effects at
the micro-level of corporate governance, it may impart certain benefits at the
macro-level of a state-led capitalistic system. See HARRISON, supra note 195, at
116 (noting that while Confucian philosophy have been associated with authority,
hierarchy, and order, it also supported "education, merit, discipline, and work,
coupled with the Taoist tradition of frugality, [which] have been an important
driving force in the immense achievements in human progress in East Asia
during the past forty years"); see also Teemu Ruskola, What Is a Corporation?
Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of EnterpriseOrganization(and State,
Family, and Personhood), 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639, 645-47 (2014).
382. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act protects foreign investments. See
FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION ACT, Act No. 16131, (Korea Legislation
Research Institute 2019) (S. Kor.) But it proscribes foreign investment "[w]here
the activity threatens the maintenance of national safety and public order." Id.
art. 4(2)(1). "National safety" seems to relate to "national security" interests.
Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act, Presidential
Decree No. 28212, July 26, 2017, art. 5(1)2, (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute online database,
https:/elaw.klri.re.kr/
engservice/lawView.do?hseq=44628&lang=ENG. The scope of "public order" is
less clear. Presumably, it could encompass the acquisitions of large companies if
they are deemed to disrupt the national economy and welfare. Also, article 4(2)3
has a catch-all provision stating that foreign investment is prohibited "[w]here
the activity violates the [country's] acts and subordinate statutes." Id. art. 4(2)3.
383. RHo, supra note 109, at 105.
384. See Bird v. Wilmington Soc. of Fine Arts, 43 A.2d 476, 483 (Del. 1945)
("Few principles of corporation law are clearer than that, as a general rule, a
corporation is an entity distinct from its stockholders."). Even in noncorporate
entities, which more closely align owners to the firm, the principle of entity
personhood is strongly rooted in law. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 104
(2006); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 104 (2001); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201 (1997). The
concept of legal personhood even reaches constitutional dimensions such that
corporations have some constitutional rights. See Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
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One is power and patronage. Controlling families are the highest
echelon of Korean society. 385 One need look no further for compelling
evidence than the practice of corporate leadership ascension, which
resembles an ancien regime of hereditary title rather than an embrace
of meritocracy and management talent. Chaebols provide patronage
to the entire corporate business community including managers,
386
directors, and professional advisers such as bankers and lawyers.
Although Korea is a large advanced economy, the market and
professional circles are actually small. The social fabric is tightly
knit. Korean society in general is highly interconnected with only
several degrees of separation among the entire population. Social
387
norms create a strong expectation of group conformity.
Independence under American law is an individualized inquiry. But
this underlying assumption of a culture based on strong
individualism may not transplant well. In Korea, it is possible, and
probable, that the professional managerial class is systemically
beholden.38 8 Social and business cultures are major impediments to
Dependence is not something that can be
better governance.
eliminated by just legal fiat.
There is more than just careerism. The risk of board insularity
and passivity is particularly high in a society with a strong Confucian
tradition. 389 Korean society was historically an aristocracy, and
authoritarian rule was the basis of post-war political governance until
390
Patriarchal lineage is
the recent transition to civilian government.
391
This culture is still strong among the older generation
respected.
of Koreans who likely populate the senior managerial ranks today.
Corporate managers perceive an obligation flowing to controlling
persons and families. When controlling persons dominate and one's
career depends on patronage, the abstractions of the corporation as a
385. See Tomasz Sleziak, The Influence of Confucian Values on Modern
Hierarchies and Social Communication in China and Korea: A Comparative
Outline, 8 KRITIKE 207, 217 (2014).
386. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supranote 101, at 116-19.
387. John M. McGuire, Why Has the Critical Thinking Movement Not Come
to Korea, 8 AsIA PAC. EDUC. REV. 224, 228 (2007).
388. See Chun, supra note 54, at 205-06 ("[Families] made important
strategic and managerial decisions and hired/fired senior executives, leaving
little room for growth of experienced professional managers. There is only a
limited pool of senior businessmen who are widely respected in the Korean
business community.").

389. See Black et al., supra note 12, at 557 (noting "no tradition of active
[board] discussion," lack of experience among directors, and concern "about the
effective independence of many independent directors"); BREEN, supranote 58, at
224 (noting culture and ritual of power that "the ordinary Westerner would find
peculiar" such as for example "even the top executives stand to attention when
the chairman walks in").
390. See generally LEE, supra note 339 (describing the aristocratic and
authoritarian tradition in Korean history).
391. See Sleziak, supranote 385, at 222.
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separate and distinct entity and the aggregate interest of all
unaffiliated shareholders are merely textbook concepts. 392
It is almost trite to say that a culture of independence in the
boardroom is better than one of obedience and passivity to the
authority of specific persons. Korean corporate governance suffers
from an ill-suited culture. Cultural change does not take place unless
strong forces demand them. In the case of Korean soccer, that force
was the absolute authority of a coach who demanded the elimination
of seniority and patronage on the pitch. 393 In the case of Korean Air,
that force was the corporate survival instinct. 394 In the case of Korean
corporate governance, that force may be a strong system of
accountability for breaches of the duty of loyalty when the local
market is not highly competitive and the market for corporate control
is nascent.
VI. TOWARD EFFICIENCY WITH KOREAN CHARACTERISTICS

The Korean corporate market today is at a crossroads. Since
2018, it has seen transformational leadership ascension of the third
and fourth generation of scions in the largest chaebols, and the
consequences may reverberate in the decades to come. The fate of the
economy now lies in the talent and merit of the grandchildren of
founders. Leadership in public companies should not be a birthright,
but in a chaebol system it unfortunately is.
If so, how can
inefficiencies and abuses be mitigated given endogenous conditions?
A.

Enforcement as Catalyst for Culture Change

There is a wide chasm between the statement of duties, which
resembles American doctrine, and enforcement in the Korean
system. 395 The incentive system conflates loyalties to the company
and families. Real institutional and cultural factors limit compliance
with well-formulated statements of duty. Absent legal enforcement,
independence cannot be achieved systemically.
In the Korean
situation, board independence and derivative suits are causally
linked. 396
In other words, enforcement can instill a culture of
independence that competes with social norms of hierarchy and

392. See MILHAUPT & PIsTOR, supra note 101, at 114-16 (discussing the
"chaebol problem" within Korean corporate governance).
393. See KUPER & SZYMANSKI, supra note 366, at 398.
394. See Ohlheiser, supra note 371.
395. The supremacy of shareholder rights is "conspicuous" on the surface in
Korean law, but courts are reluctant to introduce concepts of fiduciary duties in
its rulings. Kim & Park, supra note 142, at 24-25.
396. In the United States, board independence and derivative suits are
independent devices. This is seen in the demand futility doctrine, which
precludes a suit if the board was independent and disinterested. See Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
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patronage. The problem is aligning the rules of law with the actual
practice of governance.
From the American perspective, the first thought is the
derivative suit. Korea adopted the device, but in the most tepid way,
i.e., the 1/10,000 rule. 397 If the fear is exposing companies to crank or
misguided shareholders, a policy option could be to replace the rule
with a watered-down minimum investment rule. The goal would be
to include some retail shareholders while still excluding most: for
example, a rule of W50,000,000 (a little less than $50,000 under
current exchange rate). Since litigation is unpleasant, a shareholder
would have a rational basis for pursuing a derivative suit. That
39 8
motivation has social utility.
Egalitarian inclusiveness has an instrumental benefit. The
Korean corporate world is still insular and tightly connected by
399
These
business, social, family, school, and class relationships.
connections

are

generally

very important

in Korean

society. 400

Lawsuits among this class may rile prevailing social norms and
40 1
Given this
undermine one's standing in the elite stratum of society.
real dynamic, it is not surprising at all that the number of derivative
lawsuits in Korea is small. 402 However, such constraints may not bind
foreign institutional shareholders or Korean retail shareholders. The
hypothesis on retail shareholders is based on several factors: the
history of mass political activism against past authoritarian rule and
political corruption, 403 the strong information networks among
Koreans, their strong sense of collectivism and common vested
4 04
and their ambivalence, if not
interest in the national economy,
397. COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 542(6), (Korea Legislation Research Institute
2019) (S. Kor.).
398. See In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S'holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch.
1999).
399. See supra note 339 (describing Korean society).
400. See Pritchard, supra note 56, at 82 (noting that boards are filled with
insiders and friends).
401. See RHo, supra note 109, at 107 (noting that some institutional
shareholders "can hardly exercise their voting right against the management,
because they need to maintain business relations with the corporation").
402. See Black et al., in KOREAN BUSINESS LAw, supra note 5, at 28; see
generally Ok-Rial Song, Improving Corporate Governance Through Litigations:
Derivative Suits and Class Actions in Korea, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA (Hideki Kanda, et al. eds., 2008) (discussing derivative
suits in South Korea).
403. See supranote 323.
404. Koreans have a strong sense of collective unity. See supra note 339
(describing Korean nationalism). This sentiment derives from both nationalism
and Confucianism. See Hong, supra note 339, at 32-48 (attributing the strong
sentiment of "we" in Korean society to the Confucian tradition); see also Ruskola,
supra note 381, at 645 ("Perhaps the most significant difference between liberal
and Confucian worldviews . .. is that while the former seeks to divide social life
into separate spheres, the aspirational norm of Confucianism is unity.").
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hostility, toward chaebols. The well-to-do retail shareholder, who is
not misguided, would serve well as a private monitor of the worst
abuses so long as an effective and open litigation system can support
the proper use of derivative litigation.
Actions for loyalty violations can result in personal liability.405
For controlling persons, the risk is clear: they will pay out of their own
pocket.40 6 For a director who may feel beholden to controlling
persons, a real risk of legal liability could counteract a corporate
culture of conformity and lack of independence in Korean companies.
With an effective litigation system, legal liability may be the strong
force that begets managerial independence.
To some extent, the above discussion may be academic. It may
be naive to assume that policymakers and business elites would ever
allow an American-style private attorney general model to flourish.
Korea is not alone. In many advanced nations, the American
litigation model of enforcement is viewed with skepticism. The
discussion also assumes legal institutions that can mimic the
American model and a sterile socio-political environment with respect
to judicial workings. These assumptions may not hold. The private
attorney general model is not the traditional Korean way. 407
Korea is also a civil law jurisdiction.4 08 The structure of the legal
system has institutional implications for the role of the judiciary.4 09
At an ideological or cultural level, the civil-law tradition

assumes a larger role for the state, defers more to bureaucratic
decisions, and elevates collective over individual rights. It casts
the judiciary into an explicitly subordinate role. In the commonlaw tradition, by contrast, judicial independence is viewed as
essential to the protection of individual liberty. 410

This thought well describes, at least, the Korean situation. The
judiciary is subordinate to the larger role of the state in matters of
corporate law and governance and the management of the

405. See supranotes 175-78 and accompanying text.
406. See supranotes 177 & 179.
407. The state has always been strong in Korea. The society is strongly
Confucian and has a hierarchy between the state and the individual. See supra
note 196. Post-war Korean government has roots in authoritarian dictatorship.
LEE, supra note 339, at 381-82. Under civilian rule, the state still controls and
regulates many facets of society. Korean social organization and culture are not
based on American-style individualism and an extensive rights-based order as a
bulwark against state control.
408. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
409. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 511 (2001).
410. Id.

2020]

CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE

707

economy. 41 1 One expects that it defaults to supporting domestic
industry and the state. 412
The civil law tradition of Korea does not recognize the principle
of stare decisis, even if lower courts tend to follow higher court
rulings. 413 Consistent with the civil law tradition, opinions are in
brief form and do not typically develop complex bodies of law as in the
Until recently, Korean judges were
common law tradition. 414
very early in career judicial
appointed
academically trained and
or professional experience in
work
have
not
tracks, and they did
415
It remains a question on
otherwise.
business as attorneys or
principles through caselegal
and
laws
develop
can
whether courts
corporate law. 4 16
Delaware
of
hallmark
by-case adjudications, the
It also remains a question of whether the courts can sufficiently
adjudicate business litigation involving control of key economic assets
in a way that does not weigh national identity as a factor in decision4 17
making. One has real doubt in light of rulings in the SK litigation
and the repeated favorable treatment of chaebol families when they
run afoul of the law. 418 The suggestion is not that the judiciary is
4 19
corrupt, though that is a possibility as well among some judges, but
that societal expectations are so ingrained in the culture and identity
that it may be unrealistic to expect dissociation of these influences in
decision-making in a society that is so tightly bound together in webs
of social relationships, obligations, and expectations. To be clear, the
critique of Korean courts here is not based on a comparison with the
American judiciary on the dubious assertion that the American
judicial system is somehow better. One may fairly question whether
intrinsic biases affect the judiciaries of both nations. In the United
States, that question is whether judicial independence is free of the
corrupting influence of intranational politics in a milieu of
increasingly polarization of politics in general and the judicial

411.

See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.

412. THOMAS KALINOWSKI, ET AL., SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, 2015
SOUTH KOREA REPORT 29 (2015).
413. Kipyo Kim, Overview, in INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN LAW, supra note 58,

at 16.
414. Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The
Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 1445, 1448
(2012).
415. Kim & Park, supra note 142, at 25. Since 2009, Korea has required
judges to have at least five years of practice experience prior to judicial
Interview with Judge Yunkyung Bae, Asian Law Centre
appointment.
Newsletter, The University of Melbourne (Dec. 2018).
416. See supranote 212.
417. See supranote 340 and accompanying text.
418. See supranote 320 and accompanying text.
419. See Choe Sang-Hun, Ex-Chief Justice of South Korea Is Arrested on CaseRigging Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/
23/world/asia/south-korea-chief-justice-japan.html.
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appointment process in particular. 420 In Korea, that question is
whether judicial independence is free of the nationalism that is a
defining trait of the Korean society when the political and economic
considerations are inter-national. 421 Judicial independence in Korea
is weak in the context discussed here by virtue of its unique political
economy and sociology of its institutions. 422
There is little doubt that the many institutional, social and
cultural barriers cast a long shadow on the feasibility of private
litigation as an effective monitoring device.
B.

Enforcement with Korean Characteristics

If private litigation is not palatable, what could enforcement look
like beyond ad hoc actions brought by government regulators and
prosecutors? A feasible answer may lie in the National Pension
Service ("NPS").423 The NPS is a government-controlled pension
fund, a social insurance program. 424 It is the Korean equivalent of
Social Security. Under the National Pension Act, it is governed under
the Ministry of Health and Welfare.4 25 It is one of the largest
institutional shareholders in the world426 and the largest shareholder
in corporate Korea. 427

&

420. See generally Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the
Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148 (2019) (outlining a new framework for
Supreme Court reform to preserve legitimacy); Matthew W. Green Jr. et al., The
Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its Effect on Judicial Independence, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461 (2012) (describing the eroding effect of politicization on
judicial independence); Sheldon Whitehouse, ConservativeJudicialActivism: The
Politicization of the Supreme Court Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 HARV. L.
POL'Y REV. 195 (2015) (discussing the increased politicization of the Supreme
Court and presidential nominations in recent years).
421. See supra note 149.
422. Rodrigo G. Quintero, Judicial Review in the Republic of Korea, 34
REVISTA DE DERECHO 1, 4 (2010).

423. See Kim Jaewon, South Korea'sMoon Turns Pension Service into Chaebol
Watchdog, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.comlEconomy/
South-Korea-s-Moon-turns-pension-service-into-chaebol-watchdog.
424. See generally NPFat a Glance, NAT'L PENSION SERV. INV. MGMT.
https://fund.nps.or.kr/jsppage/fund/mcs_e/mcse_08_01.jsp (last visited July 3,
2020).
425.

Fund

Governance,

NAT'L

PENSION

SERV.

INV.

MGMT.

https://fund.nps.or.kr/jsppage/fund/ifm_e/mpc_e_01.jsp
(last visited July 28,
2020).
426. See Eun-Young Jeong, Want to Oversee the World's Third-Largest
Pension Fund? There's Just One Catch, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2018, 10:57 AM),
https://www.wsj .com/articles/want-to-oversee-the-worlds-third-largest-pensionfund-theres-just-one-catch-1536677863 (stating that the NPS is the world's thirdlargest pension fund with $565 billion in assets, more than the GDP of Belgium).
427. See supra note 336.
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428
The NPS's votes are extremely important in corporate affairs.
That alone could be used to promote real reform of corporate
governance if the NPS exercises voting power with an eye toward
efficiency. It could serve in a role that represents the interests of an
aggregate of unaffiliated shareholders. In addition to voting, the NPS
could be a plaintiff in derivative actions. Its publicness vitiates the
concern over the American model of private litigation. It negates the
issue of nationalism and bias in Korean courts, particularly when no
foreign investors are involved or have a stake in the dispute.
Despite this real potential, there are hurdles to reform. The NPS
is not free from the corruption that has plagued other parts of the
Korean government, particularly with respect to business dealings
with chaebols. 429 Recently, the head of the government agency that
oversees the NPS was indicted for improperly influencing the
430
The
consolidation of control by the family of the Samsung chaebol.
NPS has historically sided with management in disputes involving
other shareholders. 43 1 In a recent prominent dispute between
Hyundai and an American activist hedge fund, the NPS again sided
with management. 432 Like management, domestic shareholders, and

428. See Jeong, supra note 426 ("The job can be intensely political. [T]he
government-run pension service often casts the deciding vote in corporate
decisions.").
429. See, e.g., Martin & Jeong, supra note 106 (discussing pattern of Korean
business corruption).
430. Youkyung Lee, South Korea's Ex-Health Minister Found Guilty of
Swaying Samsung Vote, CHI. TRIB. (June 8, 2017, 7:36 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-south-korea-ex-health-ministerSee Eun-Young Jeong, South Korea
guilty-samsung-20170608-story.html.
Indicts Pension Chief Involved in Samsung Merger, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2017,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-indicts-pension-chiefPM),
9:11
involved-in-samsung-merger-1484532698; Lee Ji-Yoon, NPS May Apologize Over
Its Vote for Samsung Merger in 2015, INVESTOR (Apr. 9, 2018, 5:40 PM),
http://www.theinvestor.co.kr/view.php?ud=20180409000815.
431. See Cain, supra note 336 ("For decades, Korean fund managers have
balked at 'interfering in management"' and have "signal[ed] - yet again - that
the chaebol heirs have a powerful protector."). This policy has been at the
expense of value maximization. Id. ("It's under more pressure than ever to
exercise its shareholding authority to demand stronger returns and better
leadership of the companies it invests in.").
432. See Hyunjoo Jin, South Korean Pension Fund Deals Blow to Elliott in
Hyundai Fight, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2019, 12:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-hyundai-motor-nps/south-korean-pension-fund-deals-blow-to-elliottin-hyundai-fight-idUSKCNQV0DO ("Elliott Management received a potentially
fatal blow in its proxy fight to shake up South Korea's Hyundai Motor
Group ... [when the NPS] said it would vote down the U.S. hedge fund's
proposals."); Song Jung-a, South Korean Pension Fund Backs Hyundai in
Showdown with Elliott, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
fdb42ece-4624-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3. Elliott, managed by billionaire Paul
Singer, invested over $1 billion in Hyundai. Scott Deveau, Elliott's $1 Billion
Hyundai Stake Adds to Korea Inc. Battle, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2018, 10:25 PM),
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courts, the NPS is affected by similar cultural and social dynamics.
The difference here is that reform at the level of one institution can
impart systemic reform on the entire corporate market, such is the
potential power of the NPS as one of the largest shareholders in the
world. Stated differently, if a shareholder holds 5-10 percent of the
entire market in a chaebol system where control depends on a delicate
network of alliances, that shareholder is a kingmaker. Thus, reform
can be surgical with global effect.
Lastly, a potentially effective reform may be to remove the NPS
from the auspices of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and place it
in the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Unless the current structure
is attributable to bureaucratic turf battles or political patronage, it
must have been based on the reasoning that welfare and insurance
programs should belong to the portfolio of the agency dealing with
social welfare. However, in light of the core role of the NPS as the
most influential shareholder in Korea, the better fit is an agency that
actually has an expertise in finance and industrial strategy. The
Korean scheme seems to recognize the connection between finance
and welfare because the Ministry of Strategy and Finance provides
the Ministry of Health and Welfare certain guidelines on NPS fund
management. 433 These agencies have bureaucrats with different
education, training, and analytical outlooks-a total package of
different skill sets. 434 In the American context, if the government
were to own large stakes in corporations and desire efficiency and
return on investment, would it place control in the Department of
Health and Human Service or an agency like the Department of
Treasury? The Ministry of Strategy and Finance could potentially
consider different priorities in exercising its votes and rights as a
shareholder and custodian of the retirement savings of all Koreans.
It would more likely be a better shareholder and monitor.
VII. A LESSON FOR AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE?

Corporate law serves internal political economy and social order,
which may produce different priority interests and attendant costs.
The discussion has assumed that fundamental American rules and
principles, the basis for a comparative analysis here, have remained
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-03/elliott-takes-on-korea-incagain-with- 1-billion-hyundai-stake.
433. See Fund Governance, NAT'L PENSION SERv. MGMT. (2018),
https://fund.nps.or.kr/jsppage/fund/ifm_e/mpc_e_01.jsp.

434. Compare Mission, MINISTRY EcoN. & FIN. (last updated Apr. 1, 2018),
http://english.moef.go.kr/co/selectAboutMosf.do?boardCd=C0004
(defining the
Ministry's mission as "developing a strong economy" and "work[ing] to ensure
macroeconomic and financial stability"), with Vision & Goals, MINISTRY HEALTH
& WELFARE (last visited Apr.

7, 2020), https://www.mohw.go.kr/eng/am/am

0103.jsp?PARMENU_ID=1001&MENU_ID=100116 (expressing the Ministry of
Health and Welfare's goals as navigating social insurance, individualized care,
and Korean healthcare challenges).
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435
The
stable, perhaps axiomatic and at the point of end of history.
concepts of efficiency, fiduciary duties, legal personhood, derivative
suits, shareholder primacy, and independence are firmly entrenched
4 36
ideas about governance.
Since the production of law is a function of political economy and
social order, there is no guarantee that concepts once thought to be
axiomatic will continue unchallenged in the political and legal
systems. This is certainly not a prediction of the future. 437 Rather,
the forty-year neoliberal turn of corporate law and governance,
marked from the beginning of the Reagan era, grounded in concepts
of private property, shareholder wealth maximization, and efficiency,
may confront a future in which these interests may not take priority,
and attendant costs may be deemed to be acceptable in a cost-benefit
analysis in a social compromise.
Most will agree that the United States has undergone profound
social, political, and economic changes of late. Wealth inequity has
continued its upward ascent to a point now where it is the highest
since the Gilded Age. 4 38 The financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the
subsequent Great Recession devastated large swaths of the middle
439
Since then, the stock market has
class in the United States.
experienced one of the longest bull runs in history, and the small
440
segment of society who own capital has gotten much wealthier.

435. See generally ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING CHANCE (2015) (describing
Senator Warren's perception of the American economy).
436. See Rhee, supranote 224, at 1951, 1953, 1978.
437. "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Michael
Cavna, Niels Bohr Doodle Google: Great Quotes from a Man at the Nucleus of
2012),
7,
(Oct.
PosT
WASH.
Understanding,
Atomic
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/niels-bohr-doodle-google12-great-quotes-from-a-man-at-the-nucleus-of-atomicunderstanding/2012/10/07/1000dc02-1095-11e2-ba83-a7a396e6b2a7_blog.html
(quote by Niels Bohr, Nobel Prize (1922) in physics and founder of quantum
mechanics).
438. Paul Krugman, Why We're in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BooKS (May
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/05/08/thomas-piketty-new2014),
8,
gilded-age/ (reviewing PIKETTY, supra note 270).
439. Moritz Kuhn et al., Research: How the Financial Crisis Drastically
Increased Wealth Inequity in the U.S., HARv. Bus. REV. (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/09/research-how-the-financial-crisis-drastically-increasedwealth-inequality-in-the-u-s; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Recovery Threw the
Middle-Class Dream Under a Benz, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-class-financialcrisis.html.
440. Patricia Cohen, We All Have a Stake in the Stock Market, Right? Guess
Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/business/
economy/stocks-economy.html ("A whopping 84 percent of all stocks owned by
Americans belong to the wealthiest 10 percent of households."). Even in the
middle of the Covid-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, the stock market has,
inexplicably to many, recovered most of the losses from the initial crash and in
fact the Nasdaq reached new all-time highs. A major factor is the unprecedented
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However, consumer debt continues to increase, is now more than the
pre-financial crisis levels, and is more than the revenues of the 500
largest American companies combined and two-thirds of United
States GDP.441 Government debt has rapidly increased and now
surpasses the milestone of 100 percent of GDP.442 In the first half of
2020 during the writing and editing of this article, two extraordinary
events occurred: first, the Covid-19 pandemic has killed more than
123,000 Americans in just six months, caused unemployment and
economic distress for millions of workers not seen since the Great
Depression, and prompted unprecedented intervention in the
markets by the Federal Reserve to inflate asset values in the capital
markets; second, the killing of George Floyd, an unarmed handcuffed
black man, at the knees of police has sparked transformational
consciousness of long-existing, continuing racism and social injustice.
In the face of these tectonic economic and social changes in just the
past two decades, political outcomes have swung in unpredictable
directions and will likely do so in the future.
With respect to corporate law and governance, two recent
statements portend a possible period of uncertainty triggered by large
changes in societal conditions. One is a bill titled the Accountable
Capitalism Act, sponsored by Senator Elizabeth Warren, a former
chaired professor at the Harvard Law School and a plausible
contender for the Democratic nomination for president for the 2020
election44 3 and who may be a serious candidate in future presidential
intervention and bailout of the capital markets by the Federal Reserve. See
Jeanna Smialek & Peter Eavis, With $2.3 Trillion Injection, Fed's Plan Far
Exceeds Its 2008 Rescue, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/09/business/economy/fed-economic-rescue-coronavirus.html.
As of the
first half of 2020, the result has been a disconnect between the superficial
appearance of a healthy stock market and the real ill of the greater economy in
which unemployment is at a level not seen since the Great Depression.
441. Research & Statistics Grp., Ctr. for Microeconomic Data, HouseholdDebt
and Credit Report 2019: Q2, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 3 (Aug. 2019),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householderedit/data/pdf/

hhdc_2019q2.pdf (noting $13.86 trillion in consumer debt); Fortune 500 2018,
FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/ (last visited July 28, 2020)
(noting that Fortune 500 companies earned revenue of $12.8 trillion, accounting
for two-thirds of United States GDP); Alexandre Tanzi, U.S. Household Debt
Exceeds $14 Trillion for the First Time, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2020, 11:03 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-11/u-s-household-debtexceeds-14-trillion-for-the-first-time.
442. Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product,
FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis (last updated Mar. 26, 2020), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/GFDEGDQ188S. See Jeff Cox, US Deficit Surges 25% in Fiscal 2020 and
Is $1.1 Trillion Over the Past Year, CNBC (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:10 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/12/us-deficit-swells-25percent-in-fiscal-2020-uplpointl-trillion-over-past-year.html (stating the total national debt as $23.3
trillion).
443. Senator Warren, along with Senator Amy Kiobuchar, were endorsed by
the New York Times to be the Democratic candidates for president. Editorial
Board, Amy Klobuchar and Elizabeth Warren: The Democrats'Best Choices for
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The act would require a federal charter for large
elections.
corporations. 444 It imbues these companies with "the [corporate]
purpose of creating a general public benefit" defined as "a material
5
positive impact on society."44 This proposed law would constitute a
446
It
revolution in American corporate law for at least two reasons.
447
It would
would preempt Delaware's franchise in corporate law.
also override the rule of shareholder primacy. This proposal is not
made by a fringe politician or a misguided academic touting quack
theories, but by one of the most prominent politicians and a former
major presidential candidate running on a progressive campaign
agenda.
Another portent is a recent statement of corporate purpose by the
Business Roundtable. 448 It proclaims that corporations should
commit to customers, employees, suppliers, communities, and
shareholders: "Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to
deliver value to all of them, for the future success of our companies,
449
This statement purports to
our communities and our country."
reject shareholder-centrism. It reiterates a classic formulation of
stakeholder theory. 450 The statement should be taken seriously in
light of the association's status and prominence. But a more hardnosed view might be that it is less a genuine commitment for social
President,N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
As
01/19/opinion/amy-klobuchar-elizabeth-warren-nytimes-endorsement.html.
of the writing and editing of this article, Senator Warren is on Biden's shortlist
for vice president selection. See Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Biden's
Vice-Presidential Search: Who's on the List and Where It Stands, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/us/politics/joe-biden-vicepresident.html.

444. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 4(a)(1)(A) (2018).
445. Id. § 5(a)(1), (b)(2).
446. The proposed statute would provide more revolutionary concepts. It
mandates that at least 40 percent of the board shall be elected by employees. Id.
§ 6(b)(1). It regulates executive compensation and political spending. Id. §§ 7, 8.
It provides a provision for revocation of the federal corporate charter for harms
to stakeholders. Id. § 9(c)(2)(A)(i).
447. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV.
588 (2003) (arguing that the threat to Delaware's dominance is the federalization
of corporate law).
448. The Business Roundtable is a trade organization comprised of the chief
Members, Bus. ROUNDTABLE,
executive officers of leading companies.
https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us/members (last visited July 28,
2020).
449. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporationto Promote
'An Economy That Serves All Americans,' Bus. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-

of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that- serves-all-americans.
450. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIc MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 6 (1984) (describing the "managerial view" as an obligation "to
simultaneously satisfy the owners, the employees and their unions, suppliers and
customers").
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and economic change and more a public relation strategy in face of
current social and political pressures. 4 1 Irrespective of which view of
motivation one believes, the important point is that the most
prominent trade association representing leading figures in corporate
America felt compelled to make a high profile statement that departs
from established dogma, one that has enriched the shareholder and
managerial classes for the past four decades of the neoliberal turn.
Senator Warren and the Business Roundtable announced similar
policies that, if realized, would bring about a revolution in a
fundamental rule of American corporate law and governance. 4 2 One
should not overstate the import of mere proposals for political gain.
But it is not naive to assess that the apparent confluence of thought
from the antipodes of the ideological spectrum may indicate that
endogenous factors of political economy and social order are stressed
at the moment at least or may even be changing in some fundamental
ways. For one, the uncertain state may present an opportunity to
pursue a genuine political commitment to a deeply held ideal;45 3 for
the other, it may require a measured public relations response to felt
pressure in a time of social uncertainty and political transformation.

451. See Andrew Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty
Rhetoric?, HARV. Bus. REV. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-thebusiness-roundtable-statement-just-empty-rhetoric.
The statement has good
public relations optics for the current moment of political times. If supported by
other acts-e.g., proposals to sever the strong connection between executive pay
to shareholder value-the statement could be seen as more credible. See Rhee,
supra note 224, at 1980-81 ("The law and the legal system link the stock value
of shareholders and the architecture of the corporate system and capital markets.
These linkages clearly affect managerial incentive to maximize profit."). Some
critiques take the Business Roundtable's statement on face value. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978; George Shultz et al., Some Thoughts on
the Business Roundtable's Statement of CorporatePurpose, REALCLEAR MARKETS
(Feb.
5,
2020),
https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2020/02/05/
some_thoughtson_the_business_roundtables_statement_ofcorporatepurpose_
104069.html.
452. The Business Roundtable may not be alone among those on the same
region of the political spectrum. Senator Marco Rubio, a Republican Senator
representing Florida, has recently proposed a case for "common-good capitalism."
Marco Rubio, The Casefor Common-Good Capitalism,NAT'L REV. (Nov. 13, 2019,
6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/the-case-for-common-goodcapitalism/. He argues: "What we need to do is restore common-good capitalism:
a system of free enterprise wherein workers fulfill their obligation to work and
enjoy the resultant benefits, and businesses enjoy their right to make a profit and
reinvest enough to create high productivity jobs, which is what I mean by
dignified work for Americans." This may require sacrificing efficiency in the
traditional way that concept has been defined, i.e., profits and shareholder
wealth: "Common-good capitalism also means recognizing that what the market
determines is most efficient may not be best for America." Id.
453. See supra note 435.
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country could incrementally move toward American rules and
principles as the social cost of chaebol inefficiency becomes too great
to bear. Change may precipitate when society reaches a tipping point
on the perception of corporate purpose: that is when the chaebols no
longer serve primarily the national interest of supporting an economy
that lifts all boats from the tragedies of the twentieth century, but
instead only the private interest of aggrandizing the power and
wealth by a few plutocratic families long-chosen to serve a public
interest through the grant of the public fisc. If that social perception
crosses the tipping point, the legitimacy of the chaebol system would
be irredeemably compromised, and only corruption would remain as
the sole explanation of a very peculiar, inefficient corporate and
economic system.

With respect to the American system, it is thought by some that
454
But such
American corporate law has reached "the end of history."
455
seem in hindsight
proclamations, in law or political philosophy,
parochial to the time. In view of the current moment of history, if
endogenous conditions continue to change in basic ways, it cannot be
that the American legal system remains at some logical, natural end
of the neoliberal turn in the late twentieth century. A glimmer of this
idea is seen in the announcements of Senator Warren and the
They proposed similar changes to the
Business Roundtable.
fundamental rule of shareholder primacy that has prevailed in
456
These
American law and governance for the past forty years.
statements may be the chink in the armor of axiom. Until recently,
the possibility of such proposals advanced by bookends on the
ideological spectrum at rarefied levels of policy influence would have
been inconceivable-as improbable as the rise of Donald Trump and
Bernie Sanders in presidential politics was just a few years ago. Yet
here we are. If the United States continues down an uncertain path
in history, culture, economy, and politics, and as the pressures of the
time build, it is not hard to imagine among the possibilities an
454. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEo. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase
long-term shareholder value. This emergent consensus has already profoundly
affected corporate governance practices throughout the world. It is only a matter
of time before its influence is felt in the reform of corporate law as well.").
455. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INT., Summer 1989,
at 3, 4 (declaring "the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government").
456. See supra notes 445, 449 and accompanying text.
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incremental move toward the Korean model of conceptualizing
corporate law and governance as grounded in the public and national
interest.
Alternatively, there may be incremental moves by both countries
toward a convergence.
As endogenous conditions change, it is
uncertain whether the fixed ideas of the past several decades on both
sides of the Pacific based on prior conditions will remain fixed. The
future is unknown, but the pathways of corporate law and governance
may not be so opaque.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Corporate law serves endogenous political economy and social
order.
Because complex market-based economies have unique
societal interests and operate different forms of capitalism, countries
prioritize their interests. Efficiency is an important interest, but is
just one of many possibilities. A comparative analysis of American
and Korean rules shows that an advanced economy may choose
inefficient rules. This choice explains the divergence of the basic rules
of corporate law and practices of corporate governance between the
United States and Korea. Under the American rule- and propertycentric view, brought to the fore in the neoliberal turn of the late
twentieth century, Korean rules are flawed because they are
inefficient and result in systemic value diminution. The choice of
inefficiency reflects the fact that Korean corporate law is imbued with
a public purpose and cannot be extricated from nationalism and
societal expectations.
It is connected to the history of Korean
industrial development and today's complex mix of political, economic
and social factors4 57 Like all compromises, it comes with benefits and
costs. The problem for Korean policymakers is the weighing of
endogenous priority interests and attendant costs in light of the
country's unique condition. Both the United States and Korea, and
other countries as well, are subject to the same meta-dynamics of
political economy that ultimately determine law and governance. 458
The bundle of conditions in a social organization are not always fixed.
Their change may result in changing priority interests.

457.
458.

Black et al., supranote 12, at 539-42.
Hwa-Jin Kim, supra note 17, at 61-62.

